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QUESTION PRESENTED 
The sole issue presented by this petition is whether the 
decision of the Court of Appeals should be reviewed by this 
court because of an abuse of discretion by the Court of 
Appeals. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, W.W. & W.B. 
Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1977) . 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on June 17, 1982, alleging 
that defendants had sold pre-need mausoleum spaces to 
plaintiffs, having no intention of ever building a mausoleum. 
In 1976 and 1985 the mausoleums in question were built. 
December 2, 1987, defendants moved for summary judgment. 
(R. 1200) After considering the parties' oral and written 
arguments the court indicated it was inclined to grant 
defendants' motion. Plaintiffs responded asking for leave to 
file a fifth amended complaint, for the purpose of clearly 
stating a valid cause of action which would survive the 
arguments raised in defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
The court denied defendants' motion without prejudice and 
1 
granted plaintiffs' leave to amend. (R. 1301) Said complaint 
was also supposed to narrow the claims before the court. 
In fact, plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint only-
broadened the scope of plaintiffs' contentions, and added 
several new theories and claims not previously alleged. For 
example, plaintiffs alleged for the first time that the 
mausoleum, as built, breached a warranty regarding its 
appearance, and alleged that defendants, some five years and 
seven months before, maliciously refused to disinter a Mr. 
Wheeler, Mrs. Schoney's father, when his disinterment was 
requested by plaintiffs. (R. 1312) 
Prior to receiving defendants' Answer to the Fifth 
Amended Complaint, plaintiffs requested an expedited trial 
setting. (R. 1336-1339, 1343) Plaintiffs' motion for an 
expedited trial setting was set for hearing on February 17, 
1988. (R. 1342) Plaintiffs were not represented at the 
hearing, at which a discovery cutoff date (June 10, 1988), a 
motion cutoff date and the trial date (July 6, 1988) were set. 
(R. 1360) 
On April 29, 1988, defendants' Fourth Set of 
Interrogatories to Plaintiffs were served on plaintiffs by 
mail. (R.1361-62) Plaintiffs failed to answer within the 
30-day time to answer and failed to answer by the discovery 
cutoff. 
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Defendants' counsel contacted the office of plaintiffs' 
counsel between June 3 and June 12 to get answers to the 
interrogatories. (R. 1398, tr. 5-6) 
June 14, 1988, defendants filed a new motion for summary 
judgment containing the same arguments raised in December 
1987, plus arguments relating to the new causes of action 
raised in the Fifth Amended Complaint. (R. 1363, 64 J1 
Defendants also moved to strike plaintiffs' Fifth Amended 
Complaint for failing to respond to discovery. (R. 1363-63) 
After receiving written submissions and hearing oral 
argument, the trial court granted both motions. (R. 1372, 78-
79 ) 2 Only at the hearing did the plaintiffs deliver their 
purported Answers to Interrogatories. Neither answers nor a 
certificate of service of answers are part of the record of 
this case.3 
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. Their 
Docketing Statement and Briefs state that the summary judgment 
is appealed but do not state or argue that the order entering 
default judgment pursuant to Rule 37 was not proper. (See 
Appendix, Exhibit A (Docketing Statement), Exhibit B 
(Appellants' Brief), Exhibit C (Respondents' Brief), and 
Exhibit D (Reply Brief). This court poured the appeal over 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
While the matter was pending before the Court of Appeals, 
plaintiffs filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and a 
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Petition to Recall Jurisdiction in an attempt to circumvent 
the Court of Appeals in its consideration of the matter. 
The Court of Appeals after a full and fair hearing before 
a panel consisting of Judges Billings, Garff and Orme affirmed 
the Default Judgment, determining that consideration of the 
grant of summary judgment was not necessary. Thereafter, this 
Petition for Certiorari was filed. 
The appeal and all subsequent petitions have been filed 
solely to avoid the consequences of the failure to respond to 
defendants' motion for summary judgment and submit facts to 
controvert facts submitted by defendants sufficient to provide 
a genuine issue of material fact, and to answer defendants' 
interrogatories in order that defendants could make their 
final motions and go to trial as scheduled without prejudice.4 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS 
EACH APPLIED ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW TO 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE AND RULED PROPERLY. 
When viewed in their proper context these arguments are 
merely plaintiffs' excuses and attempts to shift 
responsibility from their own conduct and failure to comply 
with basic rules of procedural fairness, and their claim is 
simply that the striking of their complaint and consequent 
imposition of Default Judgment for failure to answer 
Interrogatories was too harsh a sanction in this case. 
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The only basis under Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure to justify certiorari is (c) 
When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so 
far sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision; 
As set forth in the facts stated above, after requesting 
and receiving an expedited trial date plaintiffs failed to 
answer defendants' final set of interrogatories which inquired 
into issues raised for the first time in plaintiffs' Fifth 
Amended Complaint, The issue of sanctions for failure to 
answer arose only after defendants' informal efforts failed 
to result in any response. (R. 1398, tr. 5-6)5 
Plaintiffs' Petition is fraught with innuendo, 
misstatements and half truths to bolster their contentions. 
For example, plaintiffs allege "Memorial Estates acknowledged 
receiving unsigned answers to its discovery on June 15. (Tr. 
p. 4 1. 20, R. 1398) (Exhibit E) Signed answers were served 
on June 20, 1988. (R. 1292)" (Exhibit F) Neither statement 
is true or supported by the record.6 The first purported 
Answers to Interrogatories, signed or unsigned, ever served 
or delivered were hand delivered by counsel for plaintiffs at 
the courthouse just prior to the hearing on June 21, 1988. 
(R. 3, 6, attached hereto as Exhibit E) 
The trial court, instead of departing from the accepted 
and usual course of judicial procedure as alleged by 
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plaintiffs, followed Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the case of W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park 
West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977). 
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that if a party fails to serve answers to interrogatories: 
The court in which the action is pending, 
on motion, may make such orders in regard 
to the failure as are just, and among 
others, it may take any action authorized 
under paragraphs (A) (B) and (C) of 
subdivision (b)(2) of this Rule. 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides that such action by the Court may 
include: 
. . . dismissing the action or proceeding 
or any party thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by default against the 
disobedient party; . . . . 
In the case of W.W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West 
Village, Inc. , 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977), just as in this case, 
the lower court granted a summary judgment and at the same 
time, granted judgment by default as a sanction pursuant to 
Rule 37(d). In Gardner, the defendants contended the sanction 
was inappropriate because they had served answers to the 
interrogatories prior to the hearing on the motion for a 
default judgment. The court rejected that argument stating 
that if a party fails to answer within the specified time 
under the rule, that party has failed to answer and the court 
may appropriately invoke the sanction of dismissal. 
Addressing the issue of judgment by default as a sanction, the 
court commented on the 1972 amendment to the rule as follows: 
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Rule 37(d) allows the imposition of 
sanctions against a party for especially 
serious disregard of the obligations 
imposed upon him by the discovery rules 
even though he has not violated any court 
order . . . . Until 1970, the rule applied 
only if a failure by a party was willful. 
This limitation has been eliminated. In 
addition, the rule now says, as Rule 
37(b)(2) always has said, that the court 
is to make "such orders with regard to the 
failure as are just." Taken together, 
these two changes mean that any failure 
of the sort described in Rule 37(d) 
permits invocation of the rule, regardless 
of the reason for the failure, but that 
the court has discretion about the 
sanction to be imposed. 
Gardner at 737, See also 8 Wright & Miller Federal Practice 
and Procedure §2291 pp. 807-802 
The Gardner court agreed that the trial court was 
justified in finding there was no reasonable excuse for the 
failure to comply with Rule 33. The court further stated 
paraphrasing the case of Merrill Lynch. Pierce. Fenner & 
Smith. Inc. v. Echols. 183 Ga. App. 593, 226 S.E.2d 742, 743 
(1976): 
. . . there was no significance in the 
fact plaintiff submitted answers to the 
propounded questions before the hearing 
on defendant's motion for sanctions. The 
court ruled once the motion for sanctions 
has been filed, the opposing party may not 
preclude their imposition by making a 
belated response in the interim between 
the filing of the motion for sanctions and 
the hearing on the motion. 
The Gardner court reiterated that sanctions are 
appropriate whether a party has moved pursuant to Rule 
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37(a)(2) for an order compelling the other party to respond 
to discovery, or not, and further stated: 
The extreme sanction of default or 
dismissal must be tempered by the careful 
exercise of judicial discretion to ensure 
its imposition is merited. Under Rule 
37(d), sanctions are justified without 
reference to whether the unexcused failure 
to make discovery was willful. The 
sanction of default judgment is justified 
where there has been a frustration of the 
judicial process vis., where the failure 
to respond to discovery impeded trial on 
the merits and makes it impossible to 
ascertain whether the allegations of the 
answer have any factual merit. 
A defendant may not ignore with impunity 
the requirements of Rules 33 and 34 and 
the necessity to respond within 30 days, 
to request additional time or to seek a 
protective order under Rule 26(c). A 
party to an action has a right to have 
the benefits of discovery procedure 
promptly, not only in order that he may 
have ample time to prepare his case, but 
also in order to bring to light facts 
which may entitle him to summary judgment 
or induce settlement prior to trial. 
Gardner at 738. 
This case is somewhat like the anecdote of the five blind 
men trying to describe the elephant. Plaintiffs' various 
positions and causes of action have been difficult to 
understand and to relate to the other positions and causes of 
action. Defendants needed the answers to interrogatories in 
order to understand the latest causes of action and the 
alleged facts supporting them. Whether or not the sanction 
of dismissal is normally imposed in cases of default is not 
applicable to this case. Since 1982 not only have plaintiffs 
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attempted to file five amended complaints, they have also 
subjected the courts to numerous (at least four) petitions for 
extraordinary relief. Because of the number of plaintiffs' 
claims, past and present, and the constant revision and 
amendment defendants were not only entitled to the answers to 
their final interrogatories, the answers were necessary for 
consideration of the final dispositive motions and for trial 
preparation, if necessary.7 
Plaintiffs' failure to respond to the interrogatories 
further prejudiced the defendants by effectively preventing 
them from following up on their timely discovery request when 
trial was set to commence only two weeks away.8 
In addition while no motion to compel had been filed by 
defendants the lower court had set discovery cutoff with 
defendants' final discovery specifically at issue and 
specifically in light of the plaintiffs' request for and 
obtaining of an expedited trial date. 
Defendants have not attempted to delay, but have only 
attempted to get a grasp of plaintiffs' ethereal theories. 
The imposition of sanctions is discretionary with the 
trial court. The circumstances warranting sanctions are 
undisputed. The sanction of default judgment is specifically 
mentioned in Rule 37. The scope of the Court of Appeals 
inquiry is limited to whether the trial court abused its 
discretion. The Court of Appeals properly concluded the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion. 
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II 
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO APPEAL 
OR EVEN ADDRESS THE ENTRY OF DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 37 
All of the argument contained in the Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, regarding the sanction of default judgment, is 
raised for the first time at this late date. Said argument 
was not raised in the trial court in response to defendants' 
Motion to Strike. Review of the appeal file containing 
plaintiffs' docketing statement, Appellants' Brief and Reply 
Brief reveals no argument whatsoever on the issue of default 
judgment. Plaintiffs did not argue that they should not be 
sanctioned unless their failure was willful. (R. 1398) 
Arguments should not be first raised in a Petition for 
Certiorari, when the issues could have been raised and 
considered in the Court of Appeals, but were not. Because 
plaintiffs failed to appeal or brief the instant issue before 
the Court of Appeals, they are precluded from claiming that 
the careful decision of the Court of Appeals now warrants 
exercise of this court's discretionary review. The Court of 
Appeals properly upheld the trial court decision. See, 
Bennion v. Hansen 699 P.2d 757 (Utah 1985); Zions First Nat'l 
Bank v. Nat'l Am. Title Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 651, 655 (Utah 
1988). 
10 
CONCLUSION 
The Argument that the Court of Appeals has "usurped the 
trial court's power" is a conclusion not justified by a review 
of the facts and decision. The Court of Appeals only upheld 
the trial court's use of power and discretion. Plaintiffs 
fail to identify any particular in which the Court of Appeals 
exercised discretion. An appellate court is required to 
uphold the trial court's ruling when at all possible. Mel 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (Utah 
1988); Bennion v. Hansen, supra; Bill Nay & Sons Excavating 
v. Neelev Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (1984). 
This case presents no special or important reason to 
warrant exercise of the Court's discretionary review 
jurisdiction. There are no disputed facts regarding the 
failure to answer and the sanctions. The courts below applied 
established principles of law in deciding the legal issue 
presented. The petition should be denied. 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure defendants move the court for an order granting 
their attorney fees on the grounds that plaintiffs' petition 
is frivolous, not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing 
law and not based upon a good faith argument. 
11 
DATED this Q? day of July, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Earl J. Peck / 
Stephen L. Henriod 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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1.Plaintiffs contend that two identical summary judgment motions 
were denied. One was denied on June 24, 1985, when plaintiffs' 
discovery had not been completed (R. 693). The subsequent motion 
dated December 29, 1988, was denied without prejudice so plaintiffs 
could attempt to rehabilitate their complaint with the fifth 
amended complaint setting into motion the chain of events leading 
to the summary judgment and default judgment. It is true that each 
motion argues that for summary judgment is proper because 
plaintiffs had failed to sustain any cause of action, however, 
there is no basis here to argue that hearing a subsequent motion 
for summary judgment after allowing a party additional time to 
correct fatal deficiencies is in any way improper. 
2. The contention is made several times that the trial court 
admitted it "had not read the file". As evidenced by the June 21, 
1988, transcript, it is clear that the court had not re-read the 
file immediately prior to the hearing on June 21, 1988, but that 
it was thoroughly familiar with the case from oral argument and its 
prior hearings. 
3.Plaintiffs imply by consistently stating "Memorial Estates claims 
to have mailed . . . " (emphasis added) that plaintiffs Fourth Set 
of Interrogatories were not served on April 29, 1988, as the 
certificate of service, signed by counsel, states they were. No 
facts in support of this contention are cited by plaintiffs. 
Counsel for defendants personally mails documents when the 
certificate is so executed. 
4.Much of the record is cited regarding the discovery history of 
the case, obviously in an attempt to make it appear that the 
defendants were derelict in their duty to respond to discovery. 
The plaintiffs never by motion or otherwise prior to appeal 
complained about any alleged delay or failure to answer or the 
content of any discovery responses of defendants, and the Court of 
Appeals properly declined to consider such contentions made for the 
first time on appeal. See, e.g. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National 
Am. Title Ins. Co., supra. 
5.Plaintiffs in their Questions for Review and Point I of their 
Argument label the failure to answer interrogatories as "excusable 
neglect" as if such a finding had been made. The failure was not 
characterized by the trial court as other than a "failure to 
answer" as required by Rule 37. It was not excusable and no 
reasons were offered to excuse the failure. 
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6.Plaintiffs contend as facts that defendants received and 
acknowledged receipt of interrogatory answers before June 21. This 
is not true, and of the two record citations which do not support 
the statements, (1) Tr. p. 4, 1. 20, R. 1398 (Exhibit E) is the 
statement of counsel for defendants at the June 21, 1988 hearing 
that plaintiffs were served the interrogatories regarding the Fifth 
Amended Complaint. The transcription is confusing but it obviously 
is not acknowledgment of receipt of answers (see Exhibit F), and 
(2) R. 1292 (Exhibit F) is a certificate of service by defendants 
to plaintiffs of certain supplementary answers to interrogatories 
on January 12, 1988. 
7.Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish Gardner, supra, because in 
Gardner the court characterized the party sanctioned as one whose 
"persistent dilatory tactics frustrated the judicial process", 
apparently not realizing that plaintiffs tactics in this case have 
frustrated the judicial process to defendants' prejudice 
particularly with respect to defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and preparation for trial. 
8.The cases cited by plaintiffs in Point I of their Argument hold 
consistently on one issue, namely that it is within the discretion 
of the trial court to award sanctions. Some discuss "willful 
failure", none discuss "excusable neglect", and none is a case in 
which a court's sanction for failure to answer under Rule 37 as it 
presently exists has been reversed. The cases requiring "willful 
neglect" predate the 1972 amendment which eliminated the 
requirement of "willful neglect" to award sanctions. See e.g. 8 
Wight & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedures §2291, page 807-
812, supra. 
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) DOCKETING STATEMENT 
i (Subject to assignment 
i to the Court of Appeals) 
i Case No. 
COMES NOW Appellant, pursuant to Rule of Utah 
Supreme Court 9, and submits the following docketing 
statement. 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
This appeal is filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(i)(as amended 1986). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court granting defendant's motion for 
summary judgment as to all claims of plaintiffs. 
JUDGMENT DATE 
The judgment appealed from was entered July 18, 
1988. Plaintiffs' notice of appeal was filed on August 16, 
1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1974, plaintiffs entered into a contract with 
defendant for purchase of mausoleum space in an uncon-
structed mausoleum. The contract provided that defendant 
would build a mausoleum when one-half the spaces for the 
mausoleum were sold. The contract also promised plaintiffs 
the use of a chapel on the cemetery grounds for funeral 
services. Plaintiff Erma Schoney's parents also purchased 
pre-need mausoleum space at the same cemetery. Plaintiffs 
brought suit alleging that the mausoleum had not been built 
timely, and that the cemetery chapel had been rented to an 
insurance company. Plaintiffs also alleged that the 
mausoleum ultimately built (several years after this lawsuit 
was filed) was different in appearance from the appearance 
represented to them at the time of purchase in 1974. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleged breach of contract and fraud. 
In 1975, plaintiff Erma Schoney's father died, and 
was interred in the ground at defendant's cemetery. Plain-
tiffs' suit alleged that this ground burial was made because 
2 
defendant promised that the mausoleum would be constructed 
in six months. In early 1987, plaintiff Erma Schoney's 
mother purchased mausoleum space in another cemetery. 
Plaintiffs allege that they requested permission to disinter 
Erma's father, but that defendants refused to allow it until 
the morning of the funeral of plaintiff, Erma Schoney's 
mother. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants lost the 
location of plaintiff Erma Schoney's father. Plaintiffs' 
suit alleged that defendant's conduct constituted an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The contract payments made by plaintiffs" were not 
held in trust for construction of the mausoleum, but were 
used for business purposes. Plaintiffs allege that this was 
in violation of an oral trust agreement, and in violation of 
statute governing pre-need cemetery sales. Plaintiffs also 
alleged that the contract required formation of a trust which 
was not done. 
Plaintiffs' action was originally certified by 
Judge Fishier as a class action on behalf of all pre-need 
mausoleum contract holders. Two years later, Judge Dee 
"decertified" the class. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding, as a 
matter of law, that defendant had not breached its contract 
to build mausoleum space, provide chapel space and to 
establish a contractual trust? 
" / J? i (I be u (X 2. Should a jury have been allowed to decide 
. ^ f t ^
 wh4ther plaintiffs suffered emotional distress from defen-
iLwu dant's breach of contract? 
3. Were all plaintiffs' claims barred as a matter 
of law by the statutes of limitation? 
4. Did Judge Dee abuse his discretion by 
"decertifying" a class of contract holders previously 
certified by another district court judge? 
5. Whether defendant's conduct regarding the 
disinterment of plaintiff Erma Schoney's father could give 
rise to intentional infliction of emotional distress? 
6. Was the trial court in error in dismissing 
plaintiffs' claims for breach of statutory, common law and 
contractual trusts? 
7. Did plaintiffs' evidence fail to raise an 
issue of fact regarding fraud or misrepresentation of 
defendant's intentions to build a mausoleum, to provide 
chapel space, and to establish trusts? 
^ 
/ 
/ 
Jfi 
g DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
P 1. All the issues listed above (except No. 4) 
were originally decided in plaintiffs' favor by Judge Dee. 
Judge Moffat should not have changed rulings made by Judge 
Dee. Madsen v. Salt Lake County Sch. Bd., 645 P.2d 658 (Utah 
1982). Likewise, Judge Dee should not have changed Judge 
Fishier's ruling regarding issue 4. 
2. Plaintiffs' claims for fraud, breach of 
contract and deceptive consumer practices, were supported by 
affidavit and deposition testimony. Summary judgment should 
only be granted when there is no reasonable probability that 
plaintiffs can prevail. Snyder v. Merkl^, 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 
1984). A correct application of this standard is determina-
tive of plaintiffs' appeal. 
3. Plaintiffs' claims for breach of statutory 
trust is supported by Utah Code Ann. §8-4-12 and 13, and §22-
4-1, et seq. 
4. Plaintiffs' claims for mental distress from 
defendant's breaches of contract is an issue of first 
impression in Utah, as are plaintiffs' claims for breach of 
common law trust. 
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5. Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress is governed by Samms v. Ecclesy 358 
P.2d 344, 11 Ut.2d 289 (1961). 
PRIOR APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiffs previously sought a writ of mandamus to 
direct Judge Dee to make findings of fact and conclusion of 
law to support his decertification order. The writ was 
granted on September 3, 1985. Plaintiffs sought a writ of 
mandamus to direct Judge Dee to allow filing of an amended 
Complaint. The petition was denied on November 18, 1985. 
ATTACHMENTS 
1. Exhibit A is a copy of the final judgment 
appealed from. 
2. Exhibit B is a copy of plaintiffs' notice of 
appeal 
DATED this c^^day of ^^^ii<iiah , 1988 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
ROfeERT J. DEBRY 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE K. SCHONEY 
IRMA J. SCHONEY, et al. , ) ORDER, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) AND JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. C82-4983 
MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC. ) 
et al., ) 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Defendants. ) 
Defendant Memorial Estates, Inc.'s: 
(i) Motion to Strike George K. Scnoney as a party 
plaintiff; 
(ii) Motion to Strike Plaintiffs1 Complaint and enter 
default judgment for failure to answer Defendant's Fourth Set 
of Interrogatories; and, 
(iii) Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing 
at the final pre-trial pursuant to the Scheduling Order, Notice 
'.*.>.:.• • .r 
and Stipulation of the parties. Plaintiffs were represented by 
counsel, Daniel F. Bertch. Defendant was represented by Earl 
Jay Peck and Stephen L. Henriod. 
Having considered the motions, affidavits and other 
submissions, and the arguments of counsel, the Court enters the 
following orders: 
Plaintiff George K. Schoney is dismissed as a party, it 
appearing that he died February 19, 1986, his death was 
suggested on the record on or before December 29, 1987 and no 
motion for substitution has been made. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for 
the reason that based upon the pleadings and the uncontroverted 
affidavits and depositions, there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact in any cause of action and defendant is entitled 
to its judgment as a matter of law. 
Judgment should be entered upon the additional ground 
that plaintiff has failed to respona to Defenaantfs Fourth Set 
of Interrogatories. Plaintiff failed: To answer the 
interrogatories within the time to answer; to answer prior to 
the Court's designated last date to respond to all outstanding 
discovery; or to answer prior to the filing of Defendant's 
motion for sanctions. Said failure to answer impedes trial on 
the merits and prejudices defendant's abi l i ty to prepare for 
the early t r i a l date, set for July 6, 1988, requested by 
plaintiffs. 
A judgment of no cause of action is, therefore, hereby 
entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff Irma 
Schoney; aefendants are awarded their costs herein, and George 
K. Schoney is dismissed as a party with prejudice. ^ E S T 
DATED this /*? day of July, 19b8. ' ~ CLERK 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
i Civil No. C82-4983 
i Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Notice is hereby given that plaintiffs hereby 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah from the judgment entered 
against them in this action on July 18, 1988. 
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J 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellate jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to §78-2-
2(3) (1) Utah Code Ann. . This case was poured over to the Court 
of Appeals pursuant to §78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is in the business of providing cemetery and 
mausoleum spaces, funeral services, markers, caskets, and 
similar products. Froirf-1972 ^ to^l974 7^Defendant began a -mausoleum 
sales program called j:public ^ relations -sales "program. - (Moore 
uepo. p. 12). Mausoleums were to be located at a Redwood Road 
location and one at 3115 East 7 800 South called the "Mountain 
View" location. Under this program, one-half the spaces of a 
proposed mausoleum were sold to families before construction (Id. 
at 9, 14-15)# Once one-half of the mausoleum spaces were sold, 
construction would begin."* (Id.) This is called "pre-need" 
because rhe sale is made before the time of death. (Id. at 8.) 
The sales program represented to consumers that the pre-need 
price was at cost and did not include a profit. (Id. at 9.) 
Sometime in [1973 or 1974 J a salesman for defendant, 
Bill Nordin, called on the Schoney family to sell them spaces 
in a mausoleum. (Nordin depc. p.8.) After hearing Nordin's 
n 
"usual presentation," the Schoneys purchased two spaces in an 
unconstructed mausoleum. (Nordin depo. p.9; Exhibit 1 to 
plaintiff's Complaint.) The purchase agreement (labeled the 
"Mausoleum Estate Agreement") obligated defendant in part: 
To provide use of the full service chapel . . . 
• * * 
To complete the mausoleum with construc-
tructionv"*". . within one year from the date 
that- the Public Relations Development Pro-
gram on that is completed, 
(Exhibit 1 to plaintiff's Complaint). The contract does not 
specify whether the spaces were to be at the Redwood Road or 
Mountain View Mausoleum. 
Nordin showed the Schoneys a drawing that laid out the 
crypt locations in the mausoleum. (George Schoney depo p. 10.) 
George and Erma selected two specific crypts located "at eye 
level". (Id. at 10,11). George Schoney testified that the 
mausoleum space he purchased was "the Memorial Estates in the 
east side" (Id, at 19) commonly known as the Mountain View 
location (Id. at 20). See also George Schoney depo. p. 21, 22 
"[the family] didn't want to be buried over there on the west 
side anyway. . . - Erma Schoney depo. p. 4-5, 9) Nordin 
represented that a chapel had been started at the Mountain View 
location (Id. at 22). He further stated that the Schoneys would 
have access to the Mountain view chapel and be able to have 
funeral services at the chapel. (Id. at 22). 
Nordin promised that the Schoneys would have use of 
the chapel at no charge (Erma Schoney depo. p. 8). He also 
^<v^ 
stated that the money from the Schoney's purchase would be 
specifically used for construction of the mausoleum. (Id.) Paul 
Moore, former general sales manager for defendant from 1960-1966f 
and a sales representative from 1972-1974 (Moore depo. p. 4, 5) ^te^y/ 
confirmed that it was his understanding that the money would be 
used for building the mausoleum. (Id. at 9, 14, 15). 
During Nordin's presentation, he showed the Schoneys 
pictures of the chapel and proposed mausoleum at Mountain View. 
(George Schoney depo. p. 9). Moore agreed that it was a standard 
policy to show an artists drawing of what the mausoleum would 
look like. (Moore depo. p 22, 23). The drawing was identified 
as Exhibit 1 to the Moore deposition. ^^^fi 
Several months after the Schoneys had purchased pre-
need spaces at Mountain View, Erma's father (Clint Wheeler) died. 
(Erma Schoney depo. p. 9). It had always been the intent of the ^ 
1
 *7/9 
Schoneys and Erma's parents to be interred together at Mountain "^-^ 
View. (Affidavit of Erma Schoney, 1/5/88 para. 1, 2) . Because 
the Mountain View mausoleum was not built, Erma had no choice but 
to have her father buried in the ground as a temporary 
arrangement. (Erma Schoney depo. p. 9). This temporary ground 
burial was induced by defendant's promise that "he [Erma's 
father] would only be there [i.e. in the ground] about six 
months." (Id.) (See also George Schoney depo. p. 41 "he would 
be moved in six months.") Erma and her family were "strongly 
opposed to ground burial" for personal reasons. (Erma Schoney 
affidavit, para. 5; Erma Schoney depo. p. 18.) Because the 
Schonevs were assured that Clinton Wheeler's ground burial was 
only temporary, no marker was placed on his grave. (Affidavit of 
Erma Schoney, para. 5). 
After Clinton Wheeler's burial in 1974, Erma and her 
mother went to the Mountain View cemetery "lots of times" to "see 
if they were building it [i.e. the mausoleum]." (Erma Schoney 
^ depo. p. 11). Erma was "very concerned" about it and "worried". 
•^ (Id.) Erma asked the defendant when the mausoleum was to be 
built. (Id.) George also testified that he went "once a year" to 
see about the building of the mausoleum (George Schoney depo. p. 
40). Defendant "told George that it would be started in the 
near future; this went on for 8 years. (Id. at 42). 
Eventually, George was told that "there wasn't enough 
people interested at the present time for them to build a 
I CA^  mausoleum."'" (Id. at 48-49). George got the impression that "they 
would never build it." (Id.). It was in 19 81 that George 
decided defendant wasn't going to build a mausoleumr and so he 
and Erma and Mrs. Wheeler purchased alternate spaces at Sunset 
Lawn mausoleum. (Id. at p. 43, 45). The Schoneys alleged that 
this was on or before March 29, 1981. (Second Amended Complaint, 
para. 11). 
During the passing years, defendant fa Had—to keep 
track of the unmarked -crave of Clinton Wheeler. (Affidavit of 
ErmaJSchoney, para. 7). Erma and defendant disagreed as to where 
Wheeler was buried. (Erma Schoney depo. p. 16). As a result, 
defendant's agent "had to use a long metal probe to locate the 
j} 
SlP C&tJ 
casket." (Affidavit of Erma Schoney^para. 7; Erma Schoney depo. 
p. 16). Erma averred that -to disturb his grave in this manner 
was very distressful to us." (Id.). 
Sometime prior to about/1977f "^he cemetery chapel at 
Mountain View was completed. The Schoneys alleged that the 
cemetery chapel was rented as office space. (Fifth Amended 
Complaint, para. 31). This was conceded in Mr. Holt's deposition 
where he stated that the salesmen "know that the area of the 
building that will eventually house the pews and the whole 
operation is currently office space..." (Holt depo. p. 42; R. g^ 
1299). Defendant instead substituted use of L.D.S. chapels 
which were provided to defendant free of charge. (Id. at p. 44). #cr 
The chapel was rented to defendant's previous company, Security 
National Life Insurance Co. (Quist depo. Ex. 1 and 2). The total *t<??f-
proceeds received by defendant from renting the cemetery chapel*^^ $ 
is at least $200,000. (Quist depo. exhibits 3-11). 
After the Schoneys decided that defendant was not going 
to build a mausoleum at Mountain View in the foreseeable future, 
they purchased substitute mausoleum spaces in an existing 
mausoleum at Sunset Lawn. (Erma Schoney depo. p. 12). Erma 
averred that: 
Before my mother died, we asked Memorial 
Estates to release my • father's body so it 
would be placed next to his wife at Sunset\ 
Lawn when she died. Memorial Estates 
refused. Finally, on the morning of my . 
mother's funeral, thev released his bodv. \ <^cd^ fC, 
This was severely distressing and upsetting \ ^j 
to us, to be faced with the inability to lay \ ab^>^ P' 
my parents to rest together. Even more 
upsetting was the fact that my mother never 
4/4^ 
1 knew she would be able to be interred with her husband. 
(Affidavit of Erma Schoney, paragraph 8.) George testified that 
"right up until the night before the funeral, we didn't know but 
what we were going to have him in one place and her in another 
place. . . - (Id.). George confirmed that Erma "spent a lot of 
nights worrying about it . . . it caused a lot of grief," 
(George Schoney depo. p. 47-48). 
„ Ajita George stated that he "still had the nightmare, until 
f we found another place [i.e. Sunset Lawn] that I could be there 
— ^ any time, the same way." (Id. at 46). 
When defendant finally relented and allowed Mr. Wheeler 
to be disinterred and transferred to Sunset Lawn, the Schoneys 
Q learned that there had been water damage to Mr. Wheeler's casket 
due to what appeared to be poor materials used. (George Schoney 
depo. p. 47). 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Class Certification: 
The Schoneys brought their claims individually and on 
behalf of a class of pre-need consumers of defendant's services. 
On February 10, 1983, the action was certified as a class action 
by Judge Fishier. (R. 202). The class was defined as "all those 
persons who have signed a standard form agreement for the 
purchase of mausoleum space from the defendant." (R. 294). On 
February 10, 19 84, defendant moved to have the class decer-
<f 
tifiec. £(R. 487)} On June 24, 1985, Judge Dee entered an order 
6 
decertifying the class. /(R. 704)J Judge Dee refused to enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the 
decertification order. (R. 681). Plaintiffs successfully 
obtained a writ of mandamus requiring Judge Dee to enter findings 
of fact and conclusions of law to support decertification. (R. 
998). Judge Dee's findings and conclusions were entered on 
December 4, 1985. j(R. 1053)?) 
Discovery; 
Plaintiffs served interrogatories on defendant on June 
17, 1962. (R. 12). Defendant answered the interrogatories on 
August 27,1982, approximately 26 days late. (R. 50). Plaintiff 
submitted to defendant a second request for documents on January 
28, 1983. (R> 197). No answer has ever been filed. The Schoneys 
submitted a third request for documents on March 1,1983. (R. 
225). No response has ever been filed. 
Defendant submitted a second set of interrogatories on 
July 11, 1983, to the Schoneys. (R. 328A). They timely responded 
30 days later on August 11, 1983. (R. 356). 
The initial round of discovery was completed by August 
11, 1983. No further discovery was conducted until June 12, 
1967, when plaintiffs submitted further interrogatories and 
another request for documents. Defendant sought and received an 
extension of time until* September 15, 1987, to answer discovery. 
(R. 1121). A discovery cut-off was imposed of December 8, 1987, 
and a trial date of December 7, 1988 set. (R. 1136). Defendant 
did not answer by September 15. Finally, on October 28, 1987, 
7 
the Schoneys' counsel sent a letter reminding defendant of its 
discovery obligation and delay. (R. 1164). Defendant partially 
answered plaintiff's discovery by mailing interrogatory answers 
on November 24, 1987. (R. 1166). This was 13 days before 
discovery cut-off. Plaintiff was forced to bring a motion to 
compel further answers on December 8, 1987. (R. 1150). This 
motion was granted, in part, by order entered December 23, 1987. 
^ J^ The Schoneys also requested more time to do follow-up discovery 
sur^X because of defendant's late and incomplete answers. This request 
was denied. (R. 1187). 
Meanwhile, defendant sent discovery to plaintiffs on 
June 26, 1987. Plaintiffs' answers were filed (without objection 
A from defendant) on August 13, 1987. Defendant claims to have 
*/A^ sent a final set of interrogatories and requests for documents to 
r 
0 plaintiffs' counsel on April 29, 1988. These were answered on 
^
 J u n e
 20, 1988. Because the answers were 18 days late, Judge 
Moffat struck plaintiffs' complaint and entered default judgment 
aoainst them. 
Trial Settincs: 
Plaintiff first certified the case for trial on May 3, 
1983. (R. 263). Defendant objected. (R. 269). Plaintiff again 
certified the case on September 13, 1983. (R. 390). Upon Judge 
Leary's poor health, plaintiff moved for a new trial judge to 
avoid delay. (R. 522) . 
Plaintiffs certified the case as ready for trial on 
April 22, 1986. (R. 1067). By scheduling order of September 22, 
8 
1966, the case was given a first place trial setting on February 
9, 1987. (R. 1069). However, Judge Dee suddenly retired 
effective January 31, 1987. Plaintiff requested a special pro 
tempore judge to prevent delay of a trial. (R. 1085). This was 
denied. By scheduling order of May 14, 1987, the case was given 
a trial date of August 24, 1987. (R. 1096). Upon defendant's 
request for a continuance, the trial date was changed to December 
7, 1987. (R. 1136). This was again changed to February 1, 1988 
upon defendant's request. (R. 1139). Upon the court's own 
motion, the trial was continued. (R. 1301). Upon plaintiff's 
request (R. 1336 and 1338), the case was reset for trial on July 
6, 1988. (R. 1360). 
Summary Judgment: 
On February 10, 1984, defendant moved for summary 
judgment as to all causes of action in plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint. (R. 494). On June 24, 1985, Judge Dee entered an 
order denying defendant's motion. (R. 693). Defendant filed a 
second motion for summary judgment es to all causes in this 
complaint on December 29, 1967. (R. 1200). This motion was in all ^ C 
second motion was denied by Judge Moffat on January, 1988. (R. ^ 
1301). Defendant filed a /thircTTrpotion for summary judgment on 4> ^ 
• — — • — . — • — • • • — • • i . — i * — — — — — ^ — — — ^ ^ 
9m 
June JL4, _1988. (R. 1363). This motion was granted by Judge
 s * 
Moffat as to a] 
1988. (R. 1377). 
ll causes in plaintiffs' complaint on June 27, ^~C^CK 
Q 
POINT / 
DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PLACE 
7 5% OF THE SCHONEY'S PAYMENTS IN TRUST UNDER 
U.C.A. 22-4-1 
A. Claim for Breach of Trust - 22-4-1. 
Utah Code Ann. §22-4-1 required defendant to maintain 
75% of the money paid by pre-need plaintiffs in a trust. The 
rt&w statute at the time of plaintiffs' purchase applied when "money 
9 *A 
is paid for a purpose of finishing or performing funeral services 
or the furnishing or delivery of any personal property, merchan-
c
>ot dise, or services of any nature to be conveyed or delivered at 
any time. . . for future use at a time determinable by the death 
of the person . . . ". §22-4-1. The act excludes "cemetery lots, 
vaults, mausoleum crypts, niches, cemetery burial privileges, and 
cemetery space..." (Emphasis added). Plaintiff claimed that the 
exclusion for "mausoleum crypts" did not extend to unconstructed 
mausoleum crypts. 
The legislature amended §22-4-1 in 1983 to include: 
personal property, merchandise, or services 
of any nature to be conveyed or delivered at 
any time . . . including ...unconstructed 
mausoleum crypts ..." 
£. §22-4-1 (1971) Required a 75% Trust. 
Pre-need sales have been so flagrantly abused in the 
cemetery business, that over half the states have enacted pre-
need laws. These laws require that money paid under a pre-need 
cemetery contract be held in trust. The case of Utah Funeral 
Directors v. Memorial Gardens of the Valleyy 408 P.2d 190, 17 
Utah 2d 227 (1965), explains the purpose of these statutes: 
10 
One of the main purposes of the pre-need laws 
is to make sure that after the solicitations 
of such contracts, the embalming and funeral 
services will be furnished as contracted to 
the extent that the trust funds and earnings 
can accomplish this. 17 Utah 2d at 232 • 
State v. Anderson, 408 P.2d 864 (Kan. 1965) added: 
[Because of] a great time lag between the 
time of beginning and performance . . . there 
is a public interest in the protection of 
funds intended for a particular purpose, from 
whatever hazard, whether the normal vicissi-
tudes of business, or plain fraud and deceit. 
The statute as originally written in 1971 shows from 
its face that it meant to cover pre-need arrangements. The title 
refers to trusts for "pre-arranged funeral plans," and indicated 
a broad reading of that phrase to include "any agreement" to 
provide property and services in the future at the time of death. 
The sale of pre-need mausoleum space fits this intention. The 
exceptions list what are normally understood to be existing 
property and services. This would not include pre-need mausoleum 
spaces. The purpose of protecting pre-need consumers would be 
frustrated by a reading excluding pre-need mausoleum sales from 
the trust protection. 
Defendant's claim was that it was selling "mausoleum 
crypts." However, defendant did not sell a mausoleum crypt. It 
sold the right to the use of a non-existent piece of personal 
property at a time -determined by the plaintiff's death. 
Defendant sold a promise to build a crvot (services) to be 
performed in the future. Thus, the 7 5% trust exemption for 
"mausoleum crypts" should not aoolv. 
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C^ If 22-4-1 (1971) Was Unclear, Then The 1983 Revision Should 
Apply Retroactively. 
The 1983 legislature made explicit that the 75% trust 
applied to unconstructed mausoleum crypts. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held "when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify 
the meaning of an earlier enactment, the amendment may be applied 
retroactively in pending actions." State, Dept. of Soc. Services 
v. Hiocs, 656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982) ..." Shelter America 
Corp. v. Ohio Cas. & Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah App. 
1987). The 1971 version was at least unclear whether the 75% 
trust applied to pre-need unconstructed mausoleum crypts. The 
19 83 amendments made clear the intent of the prior enactment, and 
the amendment should apply in pending actions such as this one. 
Further, since the operation of a cemetery is impressed 
with a public purpose, any contract implicitly includes a clause 
rendering the contract subject to any changes made in the laws. 
Diamant v. Mnt. Pleasant Westchester Cemetery Corp., 2 01 N.Y.S. 
2d 861 (Sup. 1960); Grove Hill Realty Co. v. Fercliff Assfn., 198 
N.Y.S. 2d 287 (A.D. 1960). Silver Ktn. Cem. Ass'n v. Simon, 231 
N.Y.S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Similarly, each contract has an 
implied term that the performance of the contract will comply 
with any applicable law. Hall v. Warren, 632 P. 2d 848 (Utah 
1980). Thus, the Schoneys are entitled, at a minimum, to 
interest on 75% of her contract payments from 19 63 to the 
present. 
POINT A 
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THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD 
BREACHED THE SCHONEYS' CONTRACT BY DELAYING 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE MOUNTAIN VIEW MAUSOLEUM 
A. Claim for Delay in Construction. 
Plaintiffs claimed defendant was obligated to build a 
mausoleum at Mountain View "within one year from the date that 
W\ i the Public Relations Development Program on that unit is 
(A* i completed." (Mausoleum Sales Agreement para, headed "Design and 
r^ Construction;" Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 2.) It was 
conceded by defendants that the Public Relation Development 
Program is completed upon sale of 1/2 of the spaces in the 
mausoleum. (Tr. at p. 22-24). Plaintiff claimed that defen-
dants delayed the actual completion of the Public Relations 
Development Program by voluntarily abandoning sales of the 
mausoleum spaces. (Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 3-5). 
B. Defendant's Obligation to Build a Mausoleum Began one Year 
After it Stopped Selling Mausoleum Spaces at Mountain View, 
The completion of the Public Relations Development 
Program was a condition precedent to defendant's performance. 
• Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985). Because the 
fulfillment of the conditions was dependent on defendant's acts 
(i.e. sales of mausoleum spaces), it was required to make a good-
faith effort to complete the conditions. Connor v. Stevens 
School of Business, 560 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1977). When a good faith 
effort is not made, the condition is deemed fulfilled. Conner; 
supra. Thus, defendant's obligation to build began one year from 
the time it failed to make a good-faith effort to fulfill the 
conditions by selling 1/2 of the spaces. 
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As early as 1975, defendants had abandoned its active 
efforts to fulfill the conditions by selling pre-need mausoleum 
r ^ i 
n spaces. (Keith Hughes depo., p. 35). A jury could have 
reasonably found that a good-faith effort to fulfill the 
condition would require at the least an active continuing effort 
to sell 1/2 of the spaces. Defendants put no evidence in the 
record that their abandonment was beyond their control. A jury 
could have concluded that defendant's obligation to build was 
triggered when efforts to sell 1/2 the spaces were stopped. 
Defendant also contended that plaintiff bought space at 
Redwood Road and that because a mausoleum was built in 1976, 
foJ there was no breach. (Tr. at p. 13). However, the Schoneys 
W L alleged that they bought mausoleum space at Mountain View. This 
fr \ / was supported by the affidavit or Erma Schoney and deposition 
A*V testimony of both Erma and George Schoney. Because the evidence 
g
 / ) -
^\T was conflicting as to whether plaintiffs bought at Mountain View $* 
or Redwood, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on 
the basis that a mausoleum was timely built at Redwood Road. 
POINT 
THE SCHONEYS CLAIM THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
BUILD THE MAUSOLEUM AS PROMISED SHOULD BE 
SENT TO A JURY. 
A> Claim for Breach of Warranty. 
Plaintiff claimed she was shown a drawing of the 
mausoleum intended for Mountain View. (Fifth Amended Complaint, 
para 8.) She alleaed that the mauscleum as built was different, 
and of inferior quality. The Mountain View mausoleum was built 
in 1985. (Answer to Interrogatory 5, November 24, 1987). 
E. The Statute of Limitations Began to Run When the Mountain 
View Mausoleum Was Built in 1985. 
Defendant contended that plaintiff had bought space at 
Redwood andf therefore, the wrong, if any, began upon completion 
of the 1976 Redwood mausoleum. (Tr. at p. 18). Of course, the 
Schoneys' testimony was always that they bought at Mountain View. 
Thus, the statute of limitations began to run in 1985 when the 
Mountain View mausoleum was constructed. Defendant made no claim 
that plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty was untimely if it 
related to the Mountain View mausoleum. 
C. There was No Evidence in the Record that the Mountain View 
Mausoleum (As Built) was the Same as the Mausoleum Shown to 
Plaintiffs. 
^S^ There was no evidence in the record that the Mountain 
\A° Dview mausoleum looked like the drawing shown to the plaintiffs in 
\flfi 1973. Defendant's counsel opined that "the two mausoleums are 
V^ substantially the same." (Tr. p. 17). However, Moore stated at ^ 
of his deposition that the mausoleum as shown, and the mausoleum as ^T 
j (J^t built, were "absolutely" not the same. (Moore depo. p. 24). 
hf/tM- Moore stated the constructed one was "inferior" and an "eyesore." 
(Id. at 24-25). A jury might or might not share that opinion. 
Because the trial court had no basis to decide whether the 
mausoleum was built as represented, summary judgment was 
inaocrocriate. 
POINT 
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i 
WHETHER THE CHATEL WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE 
SCHONEYS TO USE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The Schoneys' Claim for Wrongful Rental of the Cemetery 
Chapel. 
The Schoneys alleged that defendant rented out the 
^ cemetery chapel from 1977 to 1984 as office space- (Tifth 
**? Amended Complaint, para 31.) The Schoneys sought an order 
to* 
o requiring a restitution of the chapel rental proceeds to the 
owners of cemetery plots and mausoleum spaces who were entitled 
to use of the chapel.. (Id. at p. 18). 
B. There was no Factual Basis for This Court to Conclude that 
the Chapel was not Rented out and Unavailable for Funeral 
Services. 
There was no evidence in the record that the chapel 
was not rented to Security National Life. Instead, the evidence 
in the record shows that salesmen for defendant were told "the 
area that will eventually house the pews and the whole operation 
L ^ is currently office space." (Holt depo. p. 42). Further, if 
A hi the chapel was not being rented and was available, why would 
defendant substitute use of LDS chapels for funerals? (Id. at 
44). The only basis the court had to support defendant's motion 
was defendant's counsel's statement that there was an uncon-
troverted affidavit that there was a chapel available at Mountain 
View. (Tr. at 19, 51). There is no such affidavit. The trial 
court was unaware of such a basis (Tr. at p. 48). The Schoney's 
counsel specifically represented to the trial court that the 
chapel was not available because there was an insurance company 
in there. (Tr. at p. 47). 
16 
The reason that there was next-to-nothing in the record 
as to whether the Mountain View chapel was available is because 
that claim was first made at oral argument. The Schoneys had, in 
fact, made a formal request for entry onto land for the express 
purpose of taking photographs of the chapel filled with desks, 
filing cabinets, and etc. Had either counsel or the court known 
of that basis for defendant's motion, an evidentiary record could 
have been made. As it was, all the trial court had was the 
assertion of defendant's counsel that a chapel was available, and 
the assertion of the Schoney's counsel that the chapel was not 
available. Such is not the stuff of which summary judgments can 
be made. 
C. The Schonevs Could Sue to Redress a Past Use of the Cemetery 
Chapel for Non-Cemeterv Purposes. 
A cemetery may not be put to any use inconsistent with 
repose of the dead. Vidrine v. Vidrine, 225 So. 2d 6691 (La. 
App. 969) ; Michels v. Crouch, 122 S.K.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1538);Winc v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Assn, 101 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 
1940); Benson v. Lakewood Cemetery, 267 N.W. 510 (Kinn. 1936); 
Moore v. U.s. Cremation Co., 9 N.E.2d 795 (N.Y.); Kertle v. 
Riddell, 106 S.W. 2S2 (Ken. 1907); Frank v. Cloverleaf Park 
Assn, 148 A.2d 488 (N.J. 1959); Connolly v. Frobeniurs, 574 P.2d 
971 (Kan. App. 1978); Arlington Cem. Co. v. Hoffman, 119 S.E. 696 
(Ga. 1961). This prohibition is grounded in the idea that 
cemetery management are trustees. See e.c. Dennis v. Glenwood 
Cemetery, 130 A. 373 (N.J. 1924); Braun v. Kaolewood Cemetery 
Ass^Ji, 89 N.W. 872 (Kinn. 1902); Hines v. State, 149 S.W. 1058 
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(Tenn. 1911); Cave Hill Cemetery v. Gosnell, 161 S.W. 980 (Ky. 
App. 1913). 
Use of the cemetery chapel for insurance offices is a 
flagrant abuse of the interests and rights of the consumers who 
have purchased cemetery lots and mausoleum spaces. A court of 
equity should be available to redress such an abuse. 
POINT 
THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT CONCLUDE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT NO FRAUD HAD BEEN 
PRACTICED ON THE SCHONEYS. 
A. The Schoneys' Claim for Fraud: 
The Schoneys alleged that defendant had represented 
that the Schoneys had purchased specific mausoleum spaces. 
(Fifth Amended Complaint, para 18). This allegation was 
supported by the deposition testimony of the Schoneys' that they 
selected specific mausoleum spaces when Nordin made the sale to 
i \A 
I them. (George Schoney depo. p. 10-11). Moore's testimony also 
confirmed that specific spaces were sold. 
The reality is that defendant sold many more mausoleum 
spaces than it actually had. (Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 17, 
19). This fact was not explained to the Schoneys. (Id. at para. 
19). Actually, defendant stooped assianina specific crypt 
( A spaces in 1973 or 1974 (Smith depo. p. 37). This was about the 
(A^  time the Schoneys purchased. Thus, the specific mausoleum spaces 
people (like the Schoneys) thought they were buying were non-
existent . 
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Defendant's argument to the trial court was that the 
Schoneys had "not alleged" there was never a crypt available to 
them. (Tr. at p. 31). Defendant's intent was to substitute a 
crypt space at Redwood Road. Of course, the Schoneys did not 
want "any" crypt; they had purchased a specific crypt space at a 
J( specific location (Mountain View). The fact that defendant could 
/^p have substituted a different crypt in a different location merely 
points up the fraud. The tactic is a kind of bait and switch; 
consumers think they're getting one thing, but another is 
substituted. The trial court erred by concluding as a matter of 
law that the Schoneys could not prove fraud. 
POINT k 
THE SCHONEYS' CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLIC-
TION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WAS NOT TIME-
BARRED. 
— The Schonevs' Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress. 
The Schoneys pleaded a claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress in their Second Amended Complaint filed 
June 6, 1983 (Count 10). They repleaded this theory in their 
Fifth Amended Complaint cf January 26, 1988. 
B. The Statute of Limitations. 
Defendants' ground for dismissing the count for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress was "the statute of 
limitations on that claim has run." (Tr. at p. 25). No claim 
^g^ w£s made that facts alleged did not state a cause cf action. 
/W^. Defendant claimed that the relation back provision cf Rule 15(a) 
19 
did not apply because the wrong or liability alleged in the Fifth 
Amended complaint was different from that in the second Amended 
Complaint, and it required different proof. Defendant calculated 
the four-year limitation period from May 22, 1982. (Tr. at p. 
49) . 
C. Leoal Standard and Standard of Appellate Review. 
If the intentional infliction count alleged in the 
Fifth Amended Complaint "arose out of the conduct, transaction 
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
[Second Amended Complaint], the amendment relates back . . . " . 
Rule 15(c). Since the question is answered solely by comparing 
the two pleadings, the appellate court simply reviews for error. 
D. The Schonevs' Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Disti 
Rule 
•ess 
1 5 f 
m 
£J_ 
th 
to 
e Fi 
the 
ftn Am-
Claim 
ended 
for 
Comolaint 
Intentional 
Relates 
Inflict 
Back 
ion : 
Unaer 
in the 
Second Amenoed Comolamt. 
Defendant's counsel represented that the Schoneys' 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the 
Fifth Amended Complaint was a new cause of action brought up for 
the first time. (Tr. p. 25). Actually, the Schoneys pleaded a 
separate claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
in the Second Amended Complaint of June 6, 19 83, just over one 
year from the culmination of the entire transaction between the 
named parties. (Second Amended Complaint, para. 53). Under Rule 
15(c), the claim for intentional infliction in the Fifth Amended 
Complaint related back to at least the Second Amended Complaint. 
The following allegations in the Fifth Amended 
Complaint show substantial similarity with those in the Second 
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Amended Complaint. Included are citations to the April 1, 1983 
depositions of the Schoneys for the facts more specifically 
alleged in the Fifth Amended Complaint. Defendant was on notice 
of these facts since at least that time. The allegations which 
are bracketed were taken from the Second Amended Complaint: 
[Defendant's advertising program is designed 
to promise customers a sense of peace, 
comfort and security through the purchase of 
"pre-need" mausoleum space and related 
services. Plaintiffs have paid money in good 
faith. However, defendants have failed to 
provide peace, comfort, and security.] 
(Verbatim, Second Amended Complaint, para. 
53.) 
Defendant's knew, or should have known, that 
named plaintiffs were opposed to ground bur-
ial for philosophical and personal reasons. 
(Erma Schoney depo. p. 18, April , 1983). 
[Plaintiffs agreed to a ground burial for 
Clinton Wheeler in 1974 in reliance on 
defendant's express promise that he would not 
be there more than several (less than six) 
months.] (George Schoney depo. p. 16). (cf. 
Second Amended Complaint, para. 14, 
regarding defendant's scheme to substitute 
cheaper ground plots.) 
Further, because of the temporary nature of 
the interment, his grave was not marked. 
(Erma Schoney depo. p.16) 
[However, defendants intentionally or 
recklessly delayed building the mausoleum for 
years.] (cf 2c. Comoiaint' oara. 12, 13, 20, 
43-48.) 
Moreover, with the passage cf time, defen-
dants lost track of the locaticn. (Erma 
Schoney depo. p. 16). Ultimately, defendants 
were forced to use a long metal probe to 
locate the grave. (Id. at 11.) 
[Due to the long delay, and defendants' 
stated intention not to build the mausoleum, 
plaintiffs' purchased other mausoleum space 
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at Sunset Lawn.] (Id. at 11-12) (Second 
Amended Complaint, para 11). 
When plaintiff Erma Schoney's mother died, 
she was interred at the Sunset Lawn. 
Defendants intentionally refused to allow the 
father of plaintiff Erma Schoney to be 
disinterred, and reinterred at Sunset Lawn 
with his wife. (George Schoney depo. p. 4 5-
46.) Finally on the morning of the funeral, 
defendants relented and allowed plaintiff 
Erma Schoney's father to be transferred. (Id. 
at 47-48). 
[Defendants' conduct, together with the acts 
alleged above, has caused great turmoil and 
severe emotional distress to the named 
plaintiffs. Defendants' conduct was done 
wilfully and in reckless disregard for their 
rights and sensibilities.] (Second Amended 
Complaint, para. 53.) 
A reasonable person should have known that 
defendants' conduct would cause such severe 
emotional distress. (New allegations). 
Thus, the allegations in the Fifth Amended Complaint 
are nothing more than a compilation of allegations from the 
Second Amended Complaint, as more particularly set forth in the 
Schoneys' depositions of April 1, 1983. 
POINT 7 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY SERVE A 
FORMAL SUGGESTION OF DEATH, THE ACTION WAS 
IMPROPERLY DISMISSED AS TO GEORGE SCHONEY'S 
ESTATE. 
A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Defendant made an oral motion to dismiss the action as 
to George Schoney, pursuant to U.R.C.F. 25. (Tr. at p. 8). 
Defendant represented that a suggestion of death upon the record 
had been made more than 9 0 days before the hearing. (Tr. at. 
0.11). Defendant was referring to a statement in its motion for 
summary judgment filed on December 29, 19 87. (Id.). That 
motion, however, did not mention Rule 25, nor argue George 
Schoney's death as a basis for dismissal. 
B. No Proper Suooestion of Death Was Ever Made. 
A suggestion of death upon the record is a formal 
pleading. See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 30. A passing reference 
somewhere in the record to death of a party is insufficient. In 
Blair v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 104 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Pa. 984) a 
reference to death of a party was made in a pleading. The court 
stated: 
This Court does not agree that the reference 
to plaintiff's death in the November 4, 1983 
pleading triggered the running of the 90 day 
time limit. Under Rule 25(a), the time for 
filing a motion for substitution commences 
only after the death of the party is formally 
suggested on the record by the filing and 
service of a written statement of the fact of 
death as provided in Rule 5 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Form 30. United 
States v. Killer Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 
1031, 1034 (10th Cir. 1974); Mobil Oil Corp. 
v. Lefkowitz, 454 F. Supp. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977). No such formal writing was filed in 
the instant case. The reference to the death 
of the plaintiff in the pleadings is not 
sufficient to trigger the running of the 90 
day time period. 
Likewise, in Pol gov v. Anderson, 45 F.R.D. 470 
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), the court held: 
A statement made in passing curing a 
deposition is not "a statement of the fact 
of death: within the meaning of Rule 25. 
See Official Form 50 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Substitution may be made prior to 
service cf the statement. 4 Moore's Federal 
Practice 25.-02, p. 62 (1967 Supp.). 
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Attorneys are sometimes so harassed during 
the course of a litigation that they may well 
overlook an informal suggestion of death. 
When the consequences to the client of a 
slightly delayed reaction may be severe and 
the burden of providing formal notice is 
slight, insistence on the observance of 
procedural ritual is justified. 
Similarly, an answer to interrogatory is not a proper 
suggestion of death: 
The incidental mention of the deaths in 
answers to interrogatories does not appear to 
this Court to have started the 90-day period 
running. Federal Form 30 provides an example 
of the proper suggestion? the answers to 
interrogatories cited by defendants do not 
rise to the required level of formality. 
Acri v. Int. Ass'n of Mach. & Aero. Wkrs., 5 95 F.Supp 32 6, 330 
(N.D. Cal. 1983). 
No proper suggestion of death was ever made. A passing 
reference to death in an unrelated motion is insufficient. An 
answer to interrogatory is insufficient. The rules contemplate a 
formal pleading specifically referring to the provisions of Rule 
25. See Connelly v. Rathien, 547 P.2d 1336 (Utah 976) where 
dismissal was proper because "notice of death was duly made of 
record pursuant to Rule 25(a), U.R.C.P."; Nat. Eouic. Rental 
Ltd. v. Whitecraft Unl. Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507 (E.D.N.Y.1977)(ser-
vice of notice to file claim against estate is net proper 
suggestion of death). 
C. No Personal Service Was Made Pursuant to Rule 25. 
Rule 25(a)(1) recuires service of the suggestion of 
death to be made "upon persons not parties in the manner provided 
in Rule 4 for the service cf a summons." Rule 4, in turn, 
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requires personal service upon the executor or personal represen-
tative of the estate of George Schoney. Rule 4(e)(1). "The non-
parties for whom Rules 25(a)(1) and 4(d)(1) mandate personal 
service are evidently the vsuccessors or representatives of the 
deceased party'." Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundryf 769 F.2d 958, 962 
(4 Cir. 1985). Defendant offered no evidence that it had served 
the non-party, i.e. the estate of George Schoney. Defendant 
offered no evidence that an executor or personal representative 
had ever been appointed for George Schoney's estate. 
Service upon George Schoney's counsel was not suffi-
cient . 
Service on decedent's attorney above was 
inadequate. The attorney's agency to act 
ceases with the death of his client, see 
Restatement (Second) of Agency 120(1)(1958) 
and he has no power to continue or terminate 
an action on his own initiative. Because the 
attorney is neither a party nor a legal 
successor or representative of the estate, he 
has no authority to move for substitution 
under Rule 25(a)(1), as the courts have 
repeatedly recognized." Fariss v. Lunchburg 
Foundry, supra, 769 F.2d at 962. 
Also holding that the deceased's attorney "is not a 
representative of the deceased party in the sense contemplated 
by Rule 25(a)(1)" is Rende v. Kav, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
See also Brown v. -MUStain, 30 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 534 (4 Cir. 
1980)(decedent's attorney not a party or successor to party who 
can file suggestion of death); Al-Jurdi v. Rochefelbs, 88 F.R.D. 
244 (W.D.N.Y.1980)(service must be made on estate unless estate's 
attorney agrees and is authorized to acceot service of process.) 
Because George Schoney' s attorney does not automatically 
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represent his estate, defendant has never properly served George 
Schoney's estate. 
POINT < 
DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF JUDGMENT DID NOT MOOT 
THE SCHONEY'S CLAIMS 
A. The Trial Court Dismissed All the Schoney's Claims Because 
Defendant Offered to Rescind the Contract and Pay Restitu-
tion in the Amount of the Purchase Price Plus Interest. 
Defendant made an oral offer of judgment at the summary 
judgment hearing (Tr. at p. 13). The amount was $4,000 and was 
calculated by returning the money paid by the Schoney's plus 
interest. (Tr. at p. 19). Defendant seemed to argue that 
return of the money the Schoneys paid, plus interest, would 
"moot" all their damage claims. (Id.). The trial court 
apparently agreed and held that the Schoneys could never recover 
more than the $4,000 offered. (Tr. at p. 51). 
E. The Schonevs Did Not Seek Rescission and Restitution; 
Instead Tnev Souant to Affirm the Contract and Recover 
Damages. 
The Schoney's Fifth Amended Complaint never sought 
recision and a refund of the money they had paid. Instead, they 
sought interest on the money they paid (damages for delay in 
building the Mountain View Mausoleum); the difference in value 
between the mausoleum as shown and the mausoleum as built 
(damages) and their share of the money earned by defendant in 
renting the cemetery chapel (damages for loss cf use). Addition-
ally, the Schoney's sought an accounting cf trust funds, which 
does not depend on a finding of breach cf contract. The Schoneys 
also sought damages for buying substitute mausoleum spaces 
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("cover" damages) and damages for their mental and emotional 
distress. Every remedy sought (except the trust accounting) was 
based on damages for breach of contract or tort. The Schoneys 
made no request for rescission of the contract. 
C. Election of Remedies Is Up to the Schoneys, Not Defendant 
and the Trial Court. 
Ey offering rescission, defendant attempted to force an 
election of remedies on the Schoneys. Obviously, defendant feels 
it is cheaper to give the Schoneys their money back than to 
account for building an inferior mausoleum, renting out the 
cemetery chapel, abusing trust funds and obligations, and for 
mental distress caused by the lengthy delay in building the 
mausoleum. However, defendants are not allowed the option of 
choosing the least expensive remedy. If a plaintiff's damages 
exceed the purchase price, the plaintiff is free to seek damages. 
A plaintiff is entitled to an election of remedies 
"free of fraud or imposition." Anoelos v. First Interstate Bank 
of Utah, 571 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah I9E3). 
It is axiomatic that where a civil wrong 
gives rise to two or more causes of action, 
the choice of remedy is vested in the victim, 
not in the wrongdoer . . . It does not lie 
in the mouth of tne wrongdoer to oemana tnet 
his victim oe limitea to tnat cause cf action 
wnicn is most oeneficial to tne wronc-ooer. 
Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. Rptr. 230, 343 (App. Ct. 1S77) 
(Emphasis in the original.) 
The choice cf remedies beloncs to the one who 
has been defrauded and may not be forced upon 
him by the wrongdoer. 
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Moore & Co. v. Williams, 657 P.2d 984, 988 (Colo App. 1982). See 
also Mills v. Brown, 568 S.W.2d 100 (Tenn. 1978) (purchaser's 
choice whether to seek rescission or damages; not up to vendor); 
Kino v. Lindlay, 697 S.W. 2d 749 (Tex. App. 1985) ("Defendant may 
not dictate to a plaintiff which remedy he should pursue"). 
D. There was No Evidence that the Schoney's Damages Could Not 
Exceed $4 , 000 . 
There was no basis for the trial court to conclude as a 
matter of law that the damages alleged would not exceed $4,000. 
Damages such as mental and emotional distress are not capable of 
ascertainment on summary judgment anyway, and must be left to a 
jury. Thus, defendant's offer of settlement was no basis for 
dismissing the Schoney's complaint. 
A procedure similar to that of Judge Moffat's was found 
reversible error in Jarrett v. G.L. Harper & Sons, Inc., 235 S.E. 
2d 362 (W. Va. 1977). After picking a jury, the defendant 
confessed judgment in the amount of the plaintiff's out-of-pocket 
expenses. After colloquy with plaintiff's counsel, the trial 
court dismissed the case. The appellate court reversed: 
The record discloses no explanation about how 
the trial court arrived at his decision to 
force acceptance of this confession of judg-
ment upon plaintiffs. . . [W]hen a defen-
dant's offer of judgment only partially 
satisfies the plaintiff's claim for damages 
and plaintiff either rejects the tender or 
accepts it as part payment only, the court 
must consider the offer withdrawn and submit 
the case to the jury, whereas here one has 
been demanded. 
Id. at 363, 364. 
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Because the offer of judgment was only a partial 
satisfaction and w_„ rejected by the Schoneys, the trial court 
had no choice but to send the matter to a jury. 
E. The Schoneys' Complaint Should Not Have Been Discussed Even 
if their Damages Could Not Exceed $4,000. 
Assuming for sake of argument that the Schoneys' 
damages could not exceed $4,000, defendant's offer of judgment 
could not form the basis for dismissing their complaint. The 
dismissal deprived the Schoneys of both their cause of action 
and the $4,000 which defendant offered. An offer of judgment "is 
neither a defense to an action nor a bar to further prosecution 
of a suit." Kat2 Drue Co. v. Comm. Standard Ins., 647 S.W.2d 
831, 840 (Mo. App. 1963). "Defendant's reliance upon its offer 
of judgment as constituting an acceptable basis for the grant of 
summary judgment is misplaced. [It] is not a defense to an 
action and does not bar the further prosecution of a suit. 
[Citation omitted]. Killer v United Security Ins. Co., 496 S.W. 
2d 671, 876 (Mo. App. 1973). An offer of judgment is not a 
pleading, deposition, admission or affidavit which will support 
summary judgment. Id. 
What Judge Moffat did must be distinguished from the 
procedure occasionally used in class actions of offering judgment 
in excess of the named plaintiff's damages. This is done after 
class certification is denied and is done to avoid a useless 
trial. In those cases, the named plaintiff gets a judgment in 
his favor for the full amount of his individual damages. Even 
then, 'a court may not impose upon a plaintiff a settlement that 
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deprives him of relief to which he could be entitled after 
trial. [Citation omitted]." Kline v. Wolf, 702 F.2d 400, 405 
(2d Cir. 1983). Part of the relief sought in a class action is 
class certification. Thus, a judgment in favor of an indivi-
dual named plaintiff must allow for appeal of the denial of 
class certification. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 
(5th Cir. 1978) affirmed sub. nom. Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v 
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S. Ct. 1166, 63 L. Ed.2d 427 (1980). 
This prevents a large defendant from avoiding class-wide 
accountability by paying off the named plaintiff's claims 
through an unaccepted offer of judgment. 
In this case, however, defendant used its unaccepted 
offer of judgment to avoid both class liability and liability 
to the Schoneys. This approach deprives the Schoneys of both 
the offered judgment and their causes of action. No plausible 
reasoning can support this result. 
DATED this /Q day of '' ^ f c^Y * , 1989. 
DANIEL F. BERTCH1 
•1-This brief is submitted in its current form pursuant to 
the order of March 7, 1989. Appellant submits it under protest 
that the order is incorrect and that the hearing panel will be 
unfairly hampered by the abbreviated nature of the brief. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended, and 
78-2-2(4), as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff Erma J. Schoney (hereinafter "plaintiff") 
appeals from the trial court decision granting summary judgment 
to defendants Memorial Estates, Inc. and Memorial Estates 
Cemetery Development Corp. ("Memorial Estates") for failure to 
present in the record sufficient substantive material and 
relevant evidence to support her causes of action. The trial 
court found that Memorial Estates did not breach its contract 
with plaintiff and was in compliance with Utah State statutes, 
and that plaintiff's other claims were time-barred. Plaintiff 
further appeals the trial court decision dismissing George K. 
Schoney from the case for failure to substitute a party after 
his death was suggested on the record, pursuant to Rule 25 of 
the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
ruling that plaintiff failed to present in the record 
substantive material and relevant evidence to support her 
causes of action and controvert the material and relevant 
evidence presented by Memorial Estates in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
2. George K. Schoney was properly dismissed as a 
party plaintiff after more than 90 days had elapsed after his 
death was suggested on the record. 
3. In light of plaintiff's request for an expedited 
trial setting, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it struck plaintiff's complaint and entered judgment in 
favor of Memorial Estates under Rule 37(d) based on plaintiff's 
failure to respond to discovery: 
a) Within 30 days; 
b) Before the discovery cut-off; 
c) Prior to defendants' motion for sanctions; and, 
d) Plaintiff's failure to either request additional 
time, object or explain the failure to answer. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 22-4-1, Utah Code Annotated (before 1983 amendment) 
Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
Rule 25(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
The above rules and statutes are set out in full in the 
appendix hereto. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff has sued Memorial Estates for damages she 
claims arise out of her purchase of a pre-need contract for 
space in a mausoleum which was to be built in the future. She 
claims that Memorial Estates intentionally and fraudulently 
delayed construction of the now completed mausoleums. She 
alleges that the buildings do not appear as she believed they 
would appear when she purchased them. She further claims that 
the purchase funds were not properly accounted for and held in 
trust during the period of construction. Finally, she alleges 
that Memorial Estates wrongfully failed to disinter and move 
her father's remains when she requested it. 
Memorial Estates claims they have either fully 
performed all duties under the contract, or that they were able 
to perform had performance been requested. Memorial Estates 
further asserts that the claim that they failed to disinter 
Mr. Wheeler is spurious and time-barred. 
Plaintif^appealed the determinations by the trial court 
that: (1) Memorial Estates was entitled to summary judgment on 
all of the causes of action contained in plaintiff's Fifth 
Amended Complaint for the reason that there was an absence of 
evidence to withstand defendants' motion; and, (2) George K. 
Schoney's dismissal from the action pursuant to Rule 25 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was proper, due to his death and 
the failure to substitute a party in his stead. 
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It is defendants1 position that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion and (1) plaintiff failed to show 
sufficient evidence to support her case and withstand the facts 
and argument supporting the Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) 
George K. Schoney's death was suggested on the record without 
substitution and he was accordingly properly dismissed; and, 
(3) the court acted within its discretion in striking 
plaintiff's complaint for failure to answer defendants1 
interrogatories. Plaintiff has not argued that dismissal was 
improper. Plaintiff has therefore waived any argument to the 
contrary. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Plaintiff and George K. Schoney originally filed a 
complaint on June 17, 1982, alleging: 
a) A class action; 
b) Tortious bad faith; 
c) Breach of contract; 
d) Fraud; and, 
e) Violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices 
Act. (R. at 2-11) 
Memorial Estates filed an Answer denying the 
allegations in support of each cause of action. (R. at 39-44) 
Plaintiff and George K. Schoney pursued their discovery from 
1982 to 1988. Plaintiff and George K. Schoney amended their 
complaint June 8, 1983 to allege: 
a) Tortious bad faith (failure to complete mausoleum); 
b) Breach of contract (failure to complete mausoleum); 
c) Fraudulent conveyance; 
d) Violation of Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act; 
e) Breach of contract to provide chapel; 
f) Breach of trust; 
g) Breach of statutory trust; 
h) Invasion of trust corpus; 
i) Fraud; 
j) Failure to establish a statutory trust; 
k) Outrage and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (failure to complete mausoleum); and, 
1) Class allegations. 
(R. at 292-308) (Appendix, Exhibit "A") 
Plaintiff alleged the class action was certified, 
(R. at 202-204), but when evidence failed to support the 
certification, it was decertified on June 24, 1984. (R. at 
704-705) 
A. Summary Judgment 
On December 29, 1987, defendants moved for summary 
judgment. (R. at 1200-1225, 1189-1190, 1191-1193, 1198-1199) 
(Appendix, Exhibits "B," "C," "DH and "E") The motion 
demonstrated there was insufficient evidence to support any of 
plaintiff's causes of action. Therefore, because there was no 
genuine issue of material fact at issue, defendants were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff opposed the motion, filing an affidavit 
raising new issues. (R. at 1262-1265) (Appendix, Exhibit "FM) 
The court denied defendants1 motion and granted plaintiff leave 
to amend the complaint and to address the new issues and narrow 
the issues before the Court. The court, on its own Motion, 
continued the trial date. (R. at 1301) (Appendix, Exhibit "G") 
On January 26, 1988, plaintiff filed her Fifth Amended 
Complaint, alleging: 
a) Breach of contract for delayed performance; 
b) Breach of warranty; 
c) Common law fraud; 
d) Violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act; 
e) Breach of contract, unjust enrichment, 
interference with easement; 
f) Breach of common law trust; 
g) Breach of statutory trust; 
h) Invasion of trust corpus; 
i) Failure to establish a statutory trust; 
j) Outrage and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (disinterment of Mr. Wheeler); and, 
k) Class allegations, 
(R. at 1312-1342) (Appendix, Exhibit "H") 
On February 11, 1988, defendants answered again and denying the 
allegations in support of the Fifth Amended Complaint. 
(R. at 1343-1357) 
Defendants had offered judgment in the sum of 
$4,000.00, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure on January 8, 1988, after the Fifth Amended Complaint 
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was filed. (R. at 1294-1295) The tender was renewed 
February 11, 1988. (R. at 1359-1359) Neither offer was 
accepted. 
On February 17, 1988, pursuant to plaintiff's express 
request for an expedited trial date, (R. at 1338-1341), the 
court ordered a scheduling conference. (R. at 1360) Although 
plaintiff's attorneys did not appear at the scheduling 
conference and were not available by telephone, (R. at 1360), 
the court granted the request for an expedited schedule and 
set the following schedule: 
Discovery cutoff, June 10, 1988; 
Motion cutoff, June 17, 1988; 
Final pre-trial, June 21, 1988; and, 
Trial, July 6 and 7, 1988. 
Memorial Estates submitted Defendants' Fourth Set of 
Interrogatories to plaintiff by mail on April 29, 1988, 
addressing the new claims raised in plaintiff's Fifth Amended 
Complaint. (R. at 1361-1362) Plaintiff never responded, either 
by answer, objection or request for more time prior to 
defendants' motion for sanctions. On June 14, 1988, Memorial 
Estates moved for Summary Judgment, together with a Motion to 
Strike plaintiff's complaint and enter judgment against 
plaintiff, based upon plaintiff's failure to answer the 
interrogatories within the cut-off period and faced with an 
expedited trial setting of July 6. 
The parties agreed to extend the time to hear pre-trial 
motions to June 21, 1987. (R. at 1365) 
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On June 21st, at the hearing on defendants' motions, 
plaintiff's attorneys hand-delivered to counsel for Memorial 
Estates plaintiff's purported answers to Defendants' Fourth Set 
of Interrogatories. Memorial Estates did not have the benefit 
of said interrogatory answers in connection with its Motion for 
Summary Judgment or its preparation for trial. 
The court, after hearing argument, granted both 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. 
(R. at 1377-1379) (Appendix, Exhibit "I") 
B. Death of Plaintiff George K. Schoney. 
At the June 21, 1988 hearing, the court also dismissed 
George K. Schoney as a party, inasmuch as his death had been 
suggested on the record in Plaintiff's Answers to 
Interrogatories, (copies of Plaintiff's Answers to 
Interrogatories were filed with defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on December 29, 1987?) (R. at 1217) Thereafter, no 
party was substituted for him, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 1377-1379) 
Plaintiff argues in her brief that the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment on only a portion of her 
claims. She claims the record contains sufficient evidence to 
preclude the granting of summary judgment with respect to the 
following causes of action: 
1. Breach of Utah Code Ann. § 22-4-1 (75% trust); 
2. Breach of contract by delay; 
-8-
3. Breach of warranty regarding appearance of 
mausoleum; 
4. Breach of contract for availability of chapel; 
5. Common law fraud; and, 
6. Intentional infliction of emotional distress for 
refusal to disinter Mr, Wheeler. 
Plaintiff further argues that the death of George K. Schoney 
was not properly suggested on the record, and therefore, he 
should not have been dismissed. 
The pleadings contain no significant admissions 
regarding material facts. The only material facts which were 
drawn to the attention of the trial court in connection with 
the dispositive motions are those stated in the attachments to 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in the affidavits of John MacKay, Kenith M. Hughes 
and Warren J. Christensen supporting defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment and those stated in the Affidavit of Erma 
Schoney opposing said Motion. 
The alleged statements of fact in Appellant's Brief 
(excepting those statements from plaintiff's affidavit) were 
not raised in connection with defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed December 27, 1987, defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed June 14, 1988, or any other proceeding. 
These statements are not supported by the Record on Appeal. A 
majority of plaintiff's alleged facts are taiten from the 
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unfiled and unpublished depositions of plaintiff, George K. 
Schoney and other individuals, which plaintiff failed to make 
available to the trial court as required by Rule.5 4-501 and 
4-502 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Furthermore, these depositions have not been made part of the 
record on appeal by plaintiff, as required by Rule 11 of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Memorial Estates therefore submits the following 
statement of facts which were properly before the trial court 
and supported by the record on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Clinton and Anna Wheeler, plaintiff's parents, owned 
four ground burial lots located at Memorial Estates Redwood 
Road Cemetery. (R. at 1191-1192) On December 29, 1973,"the 
Wheelers gave two of their ground burial lots to plaintiff and 
her husband, George Schoney. (R. at 1169, 1192) The Wheelers 
and Schoneys subsequently traded in their ground burial lots as 
down payments toward the purchase of pre-need mausoleum spaces 
from Memorial Estates. (R. at 1192) Plaintiff and her husband 
entered into the "Mausoleum Estate Agreement" (hereinafter 
"Agreement") on January 29, 1974, made the first payment under 
the Agreement in February 1974 and continued making monthly 
payments for 36 months until the contract price was paid in 
full in January of 1977. (R. at 65, 111-112, 1192) 
Clinton Wheeler died August 13, 1974, prior to the time 
that either Memorial Estatefs mausoleum at Redwood Road or at 
Mountain Vi€>w were completed, and his funeral services were 
-10-
held at the Memorial Estates1 Chapel, located at 5858 South 900 
East, Murray, Utah. (R. at 241, 1192, 1203) No crypt was then 
available at the Mountain View mausoleum, and so, at the 
request of the family, his remains were interred at the 
Mountain View location in a ground burial plot. (R. at 1192) 
This was in accordance with the Agreement which provided that 
if a client died before the construction of the pre-need 
mausoleum crypt was completed, Memorial Estates would offer an 
alternative mausoleum location or interment in a ground burial 
plot. If the latter option was chosen, the family would have 
the right to have the deceased's remains relocated to the 
designated crypt, upon its completion, at Memorial Estates' 
expense. (R. at 10, 409) 
Mrs. Wheeler passed away on May 22, 1982. Memorial 
Estates1 services and facilities were not requested, and 
Mrs. Wheeler was interred at a mausoleum having no relationship 
with defendants (Sunset Lawn). At the family's request, Mr. 
Wheeler's remains were disinterred from the Mountain View 
ground plot vault and re-interred at the mausoleum at Sunset 
Lawn on the day of Mrs. Wheeler's funeral. (R. at 1192, 1271) 
Plaintiff and her husband, George K. Schoney, also 
purchased mausoleum spaces at the mausoleum when her parents, 
the Wheelers had purchased spaces. (R. at 244) In 1976, 
Memorial Estates completed a 128 space mausoleum at the 
Memorial Estates' Redwood Cemetery. The Redwood Mausoleum is 
part of Memorial Estates' pre-need program. The mausoleum 
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remains only partially filled. (R. at 173, 352) Additional 
crypts will be added as the need arises. (R. at 408) In April 
1985, Memorial Estates also completed a 276 space mausoleum at 
the Memorial Estates1 Mountain View Cemetery, where plaintiff 
claims she wanted her spaces to be. Spaces have also been 
available in this mausoleum at all times since completion, but 
further additions will be built as the need may arise. (R. at 
74, 173, 1192) In addition, Memorial Estates has held separate 
and reserved specific mausoleum spaces for plaintiff and her 
husband at its Redwood Road Cemetery since at least January 
1977. (R. at 1191-1193) 
Plaintiff's husband, George K. Schoney, died 
February 19, 1986, after Memorial Estates had completed 
construction of both the Redwood Road and the Mountain View 
mausoleums. However, George K. Schoney was also interred at 
the mausoleum space at Sunset Lawn as had^plaintiff's parents, 
Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler. (R. at 1217-1218) Plaintiff has never 
requested the use of Memorial Estates' facilities and services 
in connection with any lot, space or contract right owned by 
her. (R. at 583, 1192) She has made it clear that with respect 
to Mr. Schoney's death, or her own, (R. at 1219-1221), she has 
never intended to utilize the mausoleum space available at 
either Mountain View or Redwood Road, or Memorial Estates' 
chapels. Plaintiff had never made a request upon Memorial 
Estates for the use of a chapel or other facilities either at, 
or following Mr. Schoney's death. (R. at 1221) 
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Memorial Estates has always been ready, willing, and 
able to provide plaintiff with interment spaces in any of its 
completed mausoleums. Further, Memorial Estates has always 
been ready, willing, and able to provide plaintiff with the use 
of a chapel upon request as provided by the contract. (R. at 
10, 146, 583) 
By statute, Memorial Estates is required to retain 
certain funds for cemetery endowment care. There are 
sufficient funds for the cemeteries and mausoleums operated by 
Memorial Estates at both the Redwood and Mountain View 
locations. This fact has not been contested by plaintiff. 
(R. at 353, 358-359, 1199) Memorial Estates has complied fully 
and completely with the statutes and regulations of the State 
of Utah regarding cemeteries and mausoleums. (R. at 1190) In 
addition, Memorial Estates1 endowment care contains sufficient 
funds to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 8-4-2. 
(R. at 1199) 
The only documents containing averments of fact which 
were part of the record before the trial court were 
interrogatory answers, responses to requests for admission, 
affidavits and the depositions of Delmar Holt, Jr. and Richard 
Bentley, (both unsealed) as set forth below: 
Document Record 
Page No(s). 
Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set 45-49 
of Interrogatories to Defendant 
Memorial Estates, Inc. 
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Document Record 
Page No(s). 
Answers to Second Set of 50-108 
Plaintiffs' Interrogatories 
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes 141-145 
Counter Affidavit of George Schoney 148-149 
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes 173-176 
Answers to Defendants1 First Set of 236-250 
Interrogatories 
Answers to Defendants' Request for 251-256 
Admissions 
Answers to Defendants' Second 352-355 
Request for Admissions 
Answers to Defendants' Second Set of 356-364 
Interrogatories 
Affidavit of Delmar Holt, Jr. 405-406 
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes 407-409 
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes 582-584 
Affidavit of Paul Moore 992-994 
Affidavit of John MacKay 1189-1190 
Affidavit of Kenith M. Hughes 1191-1193 
Affidavit o£ Warren J. Christensen 1198-1199 
Affidavit oE Erma Schoney 1262-1265 
Affidavit of Erma Schoney 1271-1274 
Deposition of Delmar Holt, Jr. 1399 
Deposition of Richard Bentley 1400 
Assertions in the Statement of Facts submitted by 
plaintiff appear to raise questions regarding such matters as 
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representations by Memorial Estates1 salespeople, release of 
Mr. Wheeler's remains for removal to Sunset Lawn and 
discussions plaintiff alleges took place with unnamed persons 
on the mausoleum construction sites. As stated above, those 
assertions come solely from unfiled depositions, and cannot be 
rebutted by facts contained in the record. Unfortunately, 
those assertions will have been reviewed before the arguments 
pointing out why those assertions are not properly before the 
Court. Therefore, defendants, submit that in the event the 
Court finds said assertions worthy of consideration, for any 
reason, the depositions should be located, filed and reviewed 
in their entirety, in which case, the Court will find that (1) 
there is no foundation for many assertions, and (2) the 
assertions do not rise to the level of issues of material fact. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiff failed to submit sufficient relevant 
evidence to the trial court to withstand defendants' motion for 
summary judgment with the affidavits submitted in support 
thereof. 
2. The trial court properly entered judgment against 
plaintiff pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and plaintiff has failed to argue that said entry of 
judgment was improper. 
3. The suggestion of George K. Schoney's death, made 
by plaintiff's interrogatory answer in the course of this 
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matter was sufficient to satisfy Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUBMIT FACTS TO THE LOWER COURT 
SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL 
FACT AND FAILED TO CONTROVERT THE FACTS 
SUBMITTED BY MEMORIAL ESTATES. 
Plaintiff does not address the trial court's ruling on 
five of the causes of action in Plaintiff's Fifth Amended 
Complaint, (R. at 12-42), apparently accepting the trial 
court's ruling on those causes of action. 
Those causes of action that are argued in plaintiff's 
brief from Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint include the 
following: "Breach of Contract for Delayed Performance/" 
"Breach of Warranty" regarding mausoleum appearance, "Common 
Law Fraud," "Breach of Contract" for availability of chapel; 
"Breach of Utah Code Ann. § 22-4-1 (75% trust)," and 
"Outrageous & Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" for 
refusal to disinter Mr. Wheeler. With respect to each of those 
causes of action, plaintiff failed to show sufficient evidence 
to support the claim, and failed to controvert those facts 
submitted by Memorial Estates in defense of the claim. 
A. Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that Memorial 
Estates had breached the Schoney's contract. 
Plaintiff claims that Memorial Estates failed to 
perform its contractual obligations. The facts in the record 
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reveal that Memorial Estates has fully performed its 
contractual obligations. 
Those obligations are: 
1) To provide rights to mausoleum crypts for Mr. 
and Mrs. Schoney; 
2) To construct a mausoleum; 
3) To bury, disinter and place remains in 
mausoleum if space was not constructed at time of 
death; 
4) To make available a full service chapel; andf 
5) To place $20.00 in Trust "A" and $20.00 in 
Trust "B" to be applied to endowment care. 
Performance was as follows: 
1) Memorial Estates is holding two spaces for 
plaintiff at the Redwood Road mausoleum, and has 
space available at the Mountain View mausoleum, as 
well, which is available for plaintiff. 
2) Memorial Estates has constructed two 
mausoleums. 
3) Plaintiff chose to inter her husband at Sunset 
Lawn and has no intention to be interred at 
Memorial Estates. 
4) Plaintiff chose not to use a Memorial Estates 
provided chapel for her husband's funeral and has 
no intention to use a Memorial Estates' chapel at 
her own funeral. 
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5) Memorial Estates has an endowment care fund 
which meets the requirements of the State of Utah 
and which exceeds the requirements of Trust "A" 
and Trust "B". 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
summary judgment. Memorial Estates has always been ready, 
willing, and able to perform each of its duties pursuant to the 
contract entered into with plaintiff. (R. at 10, 74, 146, 583, 
1192-1193) Even if the contrary had been true, no evidence of 
damage could have been presented at trial. 
B. Plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty is 
without merit. 
Plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty is based upon 
the allegation that the mausoleums constructed by the 
defendants are different in appearance and quality from the 
appearance and quality the plaintiff believed they would have, 
based upon an artist's rendering plaintiff claimed was shown to 
her at the time she purchased her pre-need contract. First, 
The record contains no evidence of representations or 
warranties made by the defendants with respect to the 
appearance or quality of the mausoleum to be built pursuant to 
the pre-need contract. Second, the first mausoleum was 
finished in 1976. The claim for breach of warranty was first 
constructed in January 1988. The mausoleum appearance was 
obvious to the plaintiff from 1976, and therefore, she was on 
notice regarding the appearance and quality she now complains 
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of/ 12 years prior to the first filing of this cause of 
action. Third, plaintiff has admitted she is not offended by 
the appearance of the Mountain View cemetery. (R. at 353-358) 
No issue has been raised to the effect that the appearance is 
inferior in any way. Finally, the statute of limitations had 
run long before the Fifth Amended Complaint was filed 
commencing in 1976 and running in 1980. (Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25, § 78-12-25.5, as amended) 
C. Because plaintiff failed to allege the elements of 
fraud, or raise issues sufficient to justify a 
finding of fraud. 
In order to recover for fraud plaintiff must 
specifically plead and prove the following: (1) that a 
representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) recklessly made knowing 
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party 
to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did, in fact, rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to its injury and 
damage. Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978); 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-145, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 
(1952). In addition, the plaintiff must plead the conduct 
constituting fraud with particularity, (Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 9(b)), and the evidence of fraud must be "clear 
and convincing." Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 
(Utah 1980). 
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Plaintiff argues that the fraudulent conduct relates to 
defendants1 representations that they would perform in the 
future by building mausoleums. Plaintiff's argument fails 
because there was no misrepresentation. Memorial Estates has 
built two mausoleums and has more than adequate crypt space 
available. Plaintiff's argument also fails because she has 
pled the allegations of fraud insufficiently. Because Memorial 
Estates' representation relates to future performance. The 
party pleading fraud must show that the defendants did not 
intend to perform at the time the promise was made. Rice, 
Melby Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt ^ake County, 646 P.2d 696, 698 
(Utah 1982). A subsequent change of mind or nonperformance is 
insufficient to prove fraud. Id. Plaintiff failed to show how 
Memorial Estates did not"intend to perform at the time the 
promise was made. Plaintiff, in fact, would never be able to 
show Memorial Estates did not intend to peform, since Memorial 
Estates has in fact performed the promise. Finally, it should 
be noted that plaintiff never presented a submission which 
would raise the issue of any damage having been caused, even if 
her claim could be proven. 
Those facts argued in the Brief of Appellant are not 
supported in the Record. Plaintiff does not point out a single 
fact from the Record from which it can be inferred that 
Memorial Estates did not intend to perform each of its 
obligations under the contract, at the time the contract was 
entered into. 
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D, Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the 
chapel was not available for her use. 
As set forth in the facts above. Memorial Estates has 
always been ready, willing, and able to provide a chapel for 
plaintiff's use. Plaintiff has never presented a submission to 
controvert the affidavit of Kenith Hughes on this issue. 
Plaintiff has never made request or demand on Memorial Estates 
for the use of a chapel. (R. at 583) In her Response to 
Defendants1 First Request for Admissions, plaintiff admitted: 
Request No. 9: 
Admit that as of the date Plaintiffs 
filed their complaint they had not at 
any time requested the defendant to 
provide them the use of the chapel. 
Response: 
Deny in part. Plaintiffs have not 
requested chapel space for their own 
burial. 
(R. at 254) See also Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories, 
dated August 13 , 1987, 11118 and 14 . ) 
Not only is the evidence uncontroverted that a chapel 
was available and that plaintiff never asked to use the chapel; 
additionally, the plaintiff, made a submission which would raise 
the issue of any damage having been caused even if this claim 
could be proven. 
E. Memorial Estates has committed no breach of trust. 
As revealed by the affidavits of John MacKay, Warren 
Christensen and Kenith Hughes, Memorial Estates has complied 
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with all the conditions required of it by state statute 
regarding the maintenance of any endowment trust funds. 
Memorial Estates is audited on a yearly basis and these audits 
have revealed that Memorial Estates maintains the necessary 
money available for mausoleum and cemetery construction. 
(R. at 1190, 1199) 
In addition. Section 22-4-1 of the Utah Code provided, 
at the time of acts complained of, that the 75% trust 
requirement did not apply to cemetery lots, vaults, mausoleum 
crypts, niches, cemetery burial privileges and cemetery space. 
The Schoneys had made their final payments in 1977. At that 
time, there was no requirement for any of that money paid to be 
set aside in trust pursuant to Section 22-4-1. In 1983, the 
legislature amended that section to include mausoleum space, 
but that provision is not applicable to the cause of action in 
this appeal because the last payment had been made six years 
before the amendment. Therefore, there can be no violation of 
that section as alleged by plaintiff. 
The purpose of the 75% trust requirement is to ensure 
that funds are available to provide the services promised in 
the pre-need contract. In this case, the mausoleum promised 
was constructed, the construction trust requirement, if any, 
expired upon construction. Further, the facts reveal that 
Memorial Estates is in full compliance with all statutory 
endowment care requirements and, therefore, plaintiff cannot 
claim she has been damaged in any way. 
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Plaintiff's contract contains references to Trust "A" 
and Trust "B", endowment care trusts into which $20 of 
plaintiff's purchase funds were to be placed in each. At the 
time the present parties who own and manage the defendant 
corporations first became involved/ which was after the time 
the plaintiff entered into her purchase contract/ but before 
she paid the last payment/ Trust "A" was insolvent. Trust "B", 
however, contains, at the present time, more than the 
requirement in the contract for "A"and "B"/ and the additional 
endowment fund required by the State also exceeds the 
requirement in the contract regarding Trust "A" and Trust "B". 
In any event/ the plaintiff has made no submission of any 
evidence to raise the issue of damages having been caused/ even 
if her claim can be proven. 
F. Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress must fail. 
In order to recover under an action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must show that 
Memorial Estates' conduct was "outrageous and intolerable." 
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah.2d 289/ 358 P.2d 344 (1961). The 
facts in this case/ even as alleged by plaintiff/ do not rise 
to this standard. Plaintiff complains that Memorial Estates 
refused to disinter Mr. Wheeler's remains which had been 
temporarily placed in a vault in a ground burial plot because 
the family wished to eventually use the as then incompleted 
Mountain View mausoleum/ rather than the completed Redwood Road 
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mausoleum. The only fact in the record is that Mr. Wheeler's 
remains were promptly disinterred after the request was made 
and they were placed in the mausoleum at Sunset Lawn on the 
very day of his wife's funeral service. Thereforef as a matter 
of law, this claim cannot stand. 
In addition, the allegations in the pleadings referring 
to the disinterment of Mr. Wheeler state the disinterment 
occurred on or before May 22, 1982. The longest possible 
statute of limitation period that could apply is four years 
from the occurrence, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25, as amended, 
even though plaintiff alleged this claim as an intentional 
tort, and the period could be less than four years. The claim 
was first made in January 1988. Because the claim was first 
raised five years and seven months after the occurrence, 
Memorial Estates was not notified of plaintiff's intent to 
raise the claim. The claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Plaintiff claims that this claim should relate back to 
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
contained in the Second Amended Complaint, filed in 1983. The 
facts upon which the claim in the Second Amended Complaint 
(R. at 308) was alleged were those plaintiff claims amount to 
intentional or wilful delay of construction of the mausoleum. 
The failure to disinter claim stands on completely separate and 
distinct factual allegations. The facts upon which the claim 
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in the Fifth Amended Complaint (R. at 1325-1326) is alleged 
concern a supposed refusal to disinter Mr. Wheeler, a claim 
never pled prior to the filing of the Fifth Amended Complaint. 
The identity between the labels on the two claims is not 
sufficient to tie the new set of facts in the Fifth Amended 
Complaint to the date of the Second Amended Complaint. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
as a matter of law that plaintiff could not prevail upon any of 
these claims, based upon the record before the trial court. 
II 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS ARE MOOT BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 
BECAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO ANSWER DEFENDANTS1 
FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES IN A TIMELY FASHION. 
THIS MATTER HAS NOT BEEN APPEALED. 
Plaintiff's brief does not contest the trial court's 
order granting defendants' Motion to Strike plaintiff's Fifth 
Amended Complaint. The ruling on that Motion, and consequent 
entry of judgment for Memorial Estates on all issues, renders 
all of plaintiff's arguments on appeal moot. 
The original complaint was filed in 1982. Defendants' 
summary judgment motion, on December 29, 1987, demonstrated 
that the conditions alleged in the complaint could not be 
proven. By way of response to defendants' December 29, 1987 
Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff requested and received 
leave of the court to file another amended complaint. It was 
filed January 26, 1988, over five and one-half years after the 
original complaint. (R. at 1312) The Fifth Amended Complaint 
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raised new issues and at least five new and additional causes 
of actionf to wit: "Breach of Warranty," "Unjust Enrichment," 
"Interference with Contract," "Breach of Common Law Trust," and 
"Outrage and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
(Disinterment of Mr. Wheeler)". The new causes of action 
required additional discovery by defendants, but the plaintiff 
had also requested that the court set an expedited trial date. 
The court granted the request and set the date of July 6, 1988 
to commence trial. 
On April 29, 1988, Memorial Estates submitted 
Defendants' Fourth Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff by 
mail. The principal fact which had changed from the dates of 
the first and second complaints to the date of the fifth 
complaint had to do with defendants' construction of two 
mausoleums. Defendants' Fourth Set of Interrogatories 
addressed issues concerning the construction and appearance of 
those mausoleums, which were issues raised for the first time 
in the plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint. 
The last day to answer interrogatories in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 33(a) was June 1, 1988, only a 
month and six days before trial. The last day to respond to 
all discovery, pursuant to the Court's scheduling order, was 
June 10, 1988. Counsel for Memorial Estates requested the 
answers from counsel for plaintiff between June 2 and June 13 
(Transcript of hearing, June 21, 1988 at 3), and, when no 
answers were forthcoming, on June 14, 1988, Memorial Estates 
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filed a Motion to strike plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint 
and to enter judgment on behalf of Memorial Estates for reason 
of plaintiff's failure to answer the interrogatories. 
Purported answers to those interrogatories were 
delivered to counsel for defendants at the time of hearing. No 
certificate regarding service or filing of complete 
interrogatory answers is in the record. 
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that if a party fails to serve answers to 
interrogatories: 
The court in which the action is pending, on 
motion, may make such orders in regard to the 
failure as are just, and among others, it may 
take any action authorized under paragraphs 
(A) (B) and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this 
Rule. 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides in part: 
. . . dismissing the action or proceeding or 
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by 
default against the disobedient party; . . . . 
In the case of W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West 
Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed a situation comparable to the one in the instant 
matter. In that case, as in this case, the court granted a 
summary judgment and at the same time, granted judgment by 
default as a sanction pursuant to Rule 37(d). Addressing the 
issue of judgment by default as a sanction, the Court commented 
on the amendment in 1972 which changed Rule 37(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to correspond with the 1970 amendment 
to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and quoted 
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8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2291, page 
807-812 with approval as follows: 
Rule 37(d) allows the imposition of sanctions 
against a party for especially serious 
disregard of the obligations imposed upon him 
by the discovery rules even though he has not 
violated any court order . . . . Until 1970, 
the rule applied only if a failure by a party 
was willful. This limitation has been 
eliminated. In addition, the rule now says, 
as Rule 37(b)(2) always has said, that the 
court is to make "such orders with regard to 
the failure as are just." Taken together, 
these two changes mean that any failure of 
the sort described in Rule 37(d) permits 
invocation of the rule, regardless of the 
reason for the failure, but that the court 
has discretion about the sanction to be 
imposed. 
Gardner at 737. 
In Gardner, the defendants contended the sanction was 
inappropriate because they had served answers to the 
interrogatories prior to the hearing on the motion for a 
default judgment. The court rejected that argument stating 
that if a party fails to answer within the specified time under 
the rule, that party has failed to answer and the court may 
appropriately invoke the sanctions. 
In Gardner, as in the instant matter, the party that 
failed to answer also failed to object to the interrogatories, 
to request additional time or to explain or justify the failure 
to answer, and the Gardner Court ruled that the trial court was 
justified in finding there was no reasonable excuse for the 
failure to comply with Rule 33. The Court further stated, 
paraphrasing the case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc. v, Echols, 138 Ga. App. 593, 226 S.E.2d 742, 743 (1976): 
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. • . there was no significance in the fact 
plaintiff submitted answers to the propounded 
questions before the hearing on defendant's 
motion for sanctions. The court ruled once 
the motion for sanctions has been filed/ the 
opposing party may not preclude their 
imposition by making a belated response in 
the interim between the filing of the motion 
for sanctions and the hearing on the 
motion. 
The Court reiterated that sanctions are appropriate 
whether a party has moved pursuant to Rule 37(a)(2) for an 
order compelling the other party to respond to discovery, or 
not, and further stated: 
The extreme sanction of default or dismissal 
must be tempered by the careful exercise of 
judicial discretion to ensure its imposition 
is merited. Under Rule 37(d), sanctions are 
justified without reference to whether the 
unexcused failure to make discovery was 
willful. The sanction of default judgment is 
justified where there has been a frustration 
of the judicial process vis., where the 
failure to respond to discovery impeached 
trial on the merits and makes it impossible 
to ascertain whether the allegations of the 
answer have any factual merit. 
A defendant may not ignore with impunity the 
requirements of Rules 33 and 34 and the 
necessity to respond within 30 days, to 
request additional time or to seek a 
protective order under Rule 26(c). A party 
to an action has a right to have the benefits 
of discovery procedure promptly, not only in 
order that he may have ample time to prepare 
his case, but also in order to bring to light 
facts which may entitle him to summary 
judgment or induce settlement prior to trial. 
Gardner at 738. 
Gardner applies to the instant case because plaintiff's 
failure to respond to the interrogatories impeded not only the 
defendants' presentation of their Motion for Summary Judgment, 
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but it also impeded preparation for trial on the merits and 
prejudiced the defendants by effectively preventing defendants 
from following up on their timely discovery request when trial 
was set to commence only two weeks away. 
Plaintiff's arguments are moot because the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in striking the plaintiff's 
complaint and entering judgment in favor of Memorial Estates, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Plaintiff never appealed this decision and 
accordinglyr it stands, thereby mooting plaintiff's appeal. 
Ill 
THE "FACTS" STATED IN PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS WERE NOT BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT AND ARE NOT PART OF THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL. 
In plaintiff's brief, plaintiff alleges facts that were 
not before the trial court and are not before this Court. 
Plaintiff has cited almost exclusively to depositions that were 
neither filed nor published, and were in fact not accessible to 
the trial court judge. The trial court judge was not apprised 
of plaintiff's reliance on said alleged facts either on 
defendants' December 27, 1987 Motion for Summary Judgment or 
upon Defendants' January 14, 1988 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 
634 (Utah App. 1987) this Court upheld the Utah Supreme Court's 
denial of a motion to supplement the record on appeal to 
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include depositions which had not been published in the trial 
court. In a concurring opinion, Judge Orme explains that it 
was the failure to file the depositions, which was fatal to the 
motion to supplement. A filed deposition may be relevant and 
material to a motion for summary judgment, and if so should be 
considered by the trial court and the appellate court. 
Rule 56(e) entitles a party to summary 
judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and answers to 
admissions on file, together with affidavits, 
if any" so warrant. 
Id. at 641 (emphasis added). 
Rule 56(e) specifically provides that the depositions be filed. 
If the depositions are not filed, the trial court 
cannot consider them or allegations regarding their content, 
because said allegations cannot be verified. Likewise, if not 
filed, the depositions cannot be part of the record on appeal. 
In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 2d 334, 384 P.2d 
109 (1963), both parties cited to depositions that had remained 
sealed. The depositions had never been seen by the trial 
court, and the supreme court therefore did not open the 
depositions. In a footnote, the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
the correctness of the depositions used by the parties could 
not be known. Thompson, at 109. 
Because the statements relied upon by plaintiff are 
cited only to unfiled depositions, plaintiff's statement of 
facts should not be considered by this Court. 
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IV 
GEORGE K. SCHONEY WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS A PARTY. 
Rule 25(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires dismissal of a deceased party unless a motion for 
substitution is made with 90 days after the death of that party 
is suggested. 
The suggestion of Mr. Schoneyfs death was made and 
filed with the Court. It was made in Plaintiff's Answers to 
Interrogatories/ a copy of which was filed with the trial court 
attached to defendants1 Memorandum in Support of their Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed December 29, 1987. (R. at 
1202-1225) The suggestion was properly recorded and served on 
plaintiff through her attorney of record. 
Ninety days after the suggestion of death was filed 
with the trial court, no party had been substituted for the 
deceased and no one had sought an extension of time in which to 
file a substitution. Finally, on June 21, 1988f Memorial 
.Estates made a motion to dismiss George Schoney as a party to 
the action. At the time of the motion to dismiss, plaintiff 
showed no circumstances which could conceivably justify her 
failure to substitute another party as plaintiff. George 
Schoney had been deceased for over 27 months, long before the 
motion was made, giving plaintiff ample time to make a proper 
party substitution. 
Plaintiff argues notifying and serving George Schoney's 
attorney is not sufficient to make a suggestion of death 
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because that attorney is not a representative of the deceased 
party's estate, and that therefore, no representative of George 
Schoney's estate was properly notified or served. However, 
notification and service on plaintiff was appropriate pursuant 
to Rule 25(a), because plaintiff is a successor heir and 
beneficiary of George Schoney and is represented by the same 
counsel that represented George Schoney up until his death in 
this action. 
Plaintiff also argues the suggestion of death was 
improper because it was not made pursuant to Form 30 of the 
forms appended to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
"Appendix of Forms," Introductory Statement, reads: "The 
following forms are intended for illustration only." Form 30 
is not required to be used in a suggestion of death. In fact, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25(a) only requires that 
the suggestion be made "upon the record by service of a 
statement of the fact of the death." Here the suggestion of 
death was made upon the record by service of a statement of the 
fact of the death from the plaintiff herself in her answer No. 
1 found in Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories. (R. at 1217) 
For the foregoing reasons, the suggestion of death was 
properly stated, served, and recorded. Because plaintiff 
failed to make a motion within 90 days of the suggestion to 
substitute the deceased party, George Schoney was properly 
dismissed as a plaintiff. 
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V 
PLAINTIFF IS LIMITED ON APPEAL TO THOSE ARGUMENTS 
CONTAINED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
Plaintiff in her docketing statement has stated many 
issues. However, plaintiff has failed to support many of those 
issues in her brief, either with any references to the record 
on appeal or with authority for the proposition contained in 
the docketing statement. The docketing statement "is not a 
brief and should not contain arguments or procedural motions." 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 9. The stating of an 
issue without argument does not serve to point out specific 
errors or points within the scope of some specific assignment 
of error. 
Where a point is merely asserted by appellate 
counsel without any argument of or authority 
for the proposition, it is deemed to be 
without foundation and requires no discussion 
by the reviewing court. 
People v. Dougherty, 188 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Dist. Cal. 1982). 
Issues listed in a docketing statement but not briefed are 
deemed abandoned. State v. Eder, 704 P.2d 465, 469 (N.M. App. 
1985). 
The docketing statement provides the court with a 
concise listing of the arguments expected to be raised by 
plaintiff and Memorial Estates. It is incumbent upon the 
plaintiff to state fully with record references and supporting 
authority the arguments which allegedly weigh counter to the 
trial court's findings. The reviewing court is not required to 
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make an independent search of the record for supporting 
authority when the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state 
the basis of its claim. See Dougherty, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 123. 
Where plaintiff has failed in her brief to support 
issues raised in the docketing statement/ the plaintiff has not 
provided Memorial Estates with a fair opportunity to respond to 
the arguments. That failure, together with the failure to cite 
the record and/or authority in support of points of error, 
constitutes waiver of any argument regarding any such claimed 
error. See Lecky v. Warren, 635 S.W.2d 752, (Tex. App. 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff does not raise factual questions which could 
in any way lead to the relief she demands. Nowhere does she 
raise any issues as to how or in what amount she has been 
damaged. She has never made demand for performance. 
Defendants were and are ready, willing and able to perform all 
of their duties under the contract. Not only did the trial 
court not abuse its discretion; but, based upon the facts in 
the record, any other action by the trial court would have been 
an abuse of its discretion. 
For a number of reasons the trial court judgment should 
be affirmed: 
1) The trial court ruling ot Memorial Estates Motion 
to Strike the Fifth Amended Complaint renders 
plaintiff's arguments on appeal on all issues moot. 
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2) Plaintiff failed to submit sufficient facts to the 
trial court to support the finding that plaintiff 
could have prevailed on any cause of action. 
3) There are insufficient facts in the record on 
appeal to support any of the arguments advanced by 
plaintiff on this appeal. 
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A class action may not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the 
Court, and notice of the proposed dismissal 
or compromise shall be given to all members 
of the class in such manner as the Court 
directs, 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
DUE PROCESS CONCERNS HAVE ARISEN IN THIS CASE 
A. Introduction 
This will not be a traditional reply brief. The 
procedural ^history of this case is so unusual that a 
traditional brief is not possible. 
Specifically, recent rulings of this Court raise 
serious due process issues. Schoney is obligated to advise the 
Court of such due process issues at the earliest possible time. 
See Sparrow v. Reynolds, 646 F. Supp. 834 (D.C.D.C. 1986); Cf. 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975 
(1967) . 
Furthermore, error is often cumulative. See In Re: 
Santrucek, 145 N.E. 739 (1924) (per Justice Cardozo); Allett v. 
Hill, 422 So.2d 1047 (Fla.App* 1982); Wiedower v. ACF 
Industries, 763 S.W. 2d 333 (Mo.App. 1988). Therefore this 
reply brief will present the due process issue in the context 
of the overall case. 
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III. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is seven years old. After a number of 
delays and superficial rulings, Judge Moffat granted summary 
judgment for Memorial Estates. The trouble is that he didn't 
bother to read the file. The summary judgment was granted on 
the broadest possible grounds. 
Because of the unusual treatment in the trial court, 
Schoney was required to brief all possible theories in this 
complex case. Because of a computer failure, Schoney's final 
79-page brief was delayed. This Court struck the 79-page brief 
and received, instead,a 30-page preliminary draft brief. 
However, the 30-page brief did not include treatment 
of the class issues. Therefore, by striking the 79-page final 
brief, this Court effectively dismissed a putative class. Such 
a dismissal violates due process standards established by the 
United States Supreme Court, as well as Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(e), which states: 
1 
A class action may not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the 
Court, and notice of the proposed dismissal 
or compromise shall be given to all members 
of the class in such manner as the Court 
directs. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
DUE PROCESS CONCERNS HAVE ARISEN IN THIS CASE 
A. Introduction 
This will not be a traditional reply brief. The 
procedural history of this case is so unusual that a 
traditional brief is not possible. 
Specifically, recent rulings of this Court raise 
serious due process issues. Schoney is obligated to advise the 
Court of such due process issues at the earliest possible time. 
See Sparrow v. Reynolds, 646 F. Supp. (D.C.D.C. 1986); Cf. 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975 
(1967). 
Furthermore, error is often cumulative. See In Re t 
Santrucek, 145 N.E. 739 (1924) (per Justice Cardozo); Allett v. 
Hill, 422 So.2d 1047 (Fla.App. 1982); Wiedower v. ACF 
Industries, 763 S.W. 2d 333 (Mo.App. 1988). Therefore this 
reply brief will present the due process issue in the context 
of the overall case. 
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B. Delay 
This case was filed on June 14, 1982. The case has 
been set and reset for trial six times! Schoney was 
responsible for one continuance due to a change in staff. (R. 
510-513.) The other continuances were granted for the 
convenience of the court or the convenience of Memorial 
Estates. Several of the delays were from first place trial 
settings. (See Chronology at Brief of Appellant, p. 8-9.) 
Twice Schoney sought assignment of a special judge to avoid 
such delays. (R. 522, 1085.) Neither request was granted. 
If this case is remanded, it will likely take another 
year to get on the trial calendar, and perhaps two years to 
process an appeal from the trial. When the Schoneys first 
walked into a lawyer's office seven years ago, little did they 
realize that it would take a decade to process their modest 
claim. 
C. Class Certification and Motions to Enlarge the Class 
Early in the litigation, the trial court judge 
(Fishier) certified the case to proceed as a class action. (R. 
186, 202-204.) 
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The original class certification was based upon 
rather narrow theories. (See R. 202-204.) Therefore, Schoney 
made a motion to enlarge the class to include the additional 
theories and additional parties. (R. 278.) At about the same 
time, Memorial Estates made a motion to decertify the class. 
(R. 487.) 
Judge Dee ruled first on the decertification motion. 
(R. 726, p. 1 & 2.) Judge Dee granted that motion to decertify 
the class.^ Next, Judge Dee entertained arguments on the 
motion to enlarge the class.2 (R. 726, p. 1-3.) 
1
 The theory of liability was that Memorial Estates 
sold space in non-existent mausoleums, and that Memorial 
Estates delayed construction for up to ten years. (See R. 2.) 
Judge Dee limited the potential class to 26 persons. 
Apparently only 2 6 persons signed the same form of contract as 
Schoneys. 
Even though the contract form changed slightly, 
Schoney presented nearly 300 contracts from customers who were 
victims of the same course of conduct. (R. 727-991.) 
As a part of that same scheme, Memorial Estates 
issued deeds in non-existent mausoleums. Schoney identified 68 
identical deeds for Mountain View and 147 identical deeds for 
Redwood. (R. 628-629.) 
* Since the class was then decertified, Schoney 
verbally amended the Motion to Enlarge the Class, to be a 
Motion to Recertify the Class based upon the new theories of 
liability. (See R. 726 at p. 3.) 
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Memorial Estates argued that the Motion to Enlarge 
the Class presented no new theories. 
MR. SWOPE: Your Honor, it's in the 
Amended Complaint, the Second Amended 
Complaint, which has been before this Court 
since June 1983, Count V, Breach of 
Contract to Provide Chapel. It's been 
before the Court. Count VI, Breach of 
Trust. It's been before the Court. Count 
VII, Breach of Statutory Trust. It's been 
before the Court. Count VIII, Invasion of 
Trust Corpus. Count X, Failure to 
Establish a Statutory Trust. All these 
have been before the Court. These are not 
new issues. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 726, p. 8.) 
The Court agreed with Memorial Estates. The Court denied 
the Motion to Enlarge the Class. However, the Court's ruling 
did not go to the merits. The Court simply concluded that the 
Motion to Enlarge the Class had already been considered: 
And the date of my decision (to decertify 
the class) being last Tuesday covers all of 
the things that have been done so far. . . 
So I've considered all of these new 
theories, and I am denying your Motion to 
Enlarge the Class for the three theories, 
which are not new theories. They have 
already been considered. They are in 
writing in the file. And I'm decertifying 
the class. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 726, p. 11-12. ) 
In short, Judge Dee (second judge) simply side-
stepped the issue. It is abundantly clear that the Motion to 
5 
Decertify the Class presents wholly different issues from the 
Motion to Enlarge the Class. (Compare R. 202-204; R. 280-285; 
and R. 487-492.) Rather Judge Dee (second judge) simply 
followed the misleading statement of Memorial Estates' 
counsel.-* 
D. Repeated Application For Summary Judgment 
After waiting literally six years to get a trial 
date (See para. B above) and after the class was dismissed 
under unusual circumstances (See C above), the eve of the 
trial finally approached. By now a third judge was on the 
scene (Moffat). 
Memorial Estates filed a motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 1363.) The Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. 
(R. 1377.) This appeal followed. 
The problem is that this was Memorial Estates' third 
try at summary judgment. Twice before Memorial Estates had 
filed — and lost summary judgment motions. (R. 700 and 
R. 1301.) The third Motion for Summary Judgment was in all 
material respects exactly the same as the first two motions for 
summary judgment. (Compare R. 472; R. 1200; and R. 136 3.) 
J
 [Mr. Swope for Memorial Estates] 
"All these have been before the Court. These are not new 
theories." (R. 726, p. 8.) 
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In short, Memorial Estates' judge shopping finally 
paid off and they found a judge who would agree with their 
theories. The problem is that such judge shopping is a square 
violation of §78-7-19, Utah Code Ann. 
If an application for an order. . . is 
refused in whole or in part. . . no 
subsequent application for the same order 
can be made to any other judge, except of a 
higher court. 
E. Failure to Review the Record 
Undaunted by the fact that the same motion had been 
heard on two prior occasions, (See Para. D above) Judge Moffat 
forged ahead. The problem is that Judge Moffat didn't bother 
with the nicety of reading the file. After two other judges 
had managed this complex case for over six years, Judge Moffat 
casually mentioned: 
We have a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Haven't had a chance to look at 
the file. . . 
(June 21, 1988 Transcript at p. 2, Lines 4-5.) 
Thus Judge Moffat could not follow his duty to, 
"... carefully scrutinize the submissions and contentions..." 
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976). Under lesser 
circumstances, federal courts have reversed summary judgments. 
Reiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 
7 
1980); Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp,, 722 
F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1983) . 
During the course of the summary judgment hearing, 
numerous fact issues were examined: viz. whether defendant's 
interrogatories were lost or delayed in the mail (June 21, 
1988 Tr. p. 5, Lines 18-25); whether Memorial Estates had ever 
made a suggestion of death on the Record (June 21 Tr. at p. 11, 
Lines 17-20; p. 12, Lines 10-13); whether an offer of judgment 
in the sum of $4,000 would satisfy all of Schoney's claims 
(June 21 Tr. at p. 14, Lines 7-11); whether Schoneys were 
shown a picture of the mausoleum before it was constructed 
(June 21 Tr. at p. 15, Lines 2-13); whether the Schoneys were 
shown a rendering of a mausoleum at Redwood Road or Mountain 
View (June 21 Tr. at p. 16, Lines 20-25); whether the 
mausoleums at Mountain View and Redwood Road were substantially 
the same (June 21 Tr. at p. 17, Lines 11-15); whether the 
construction of a mausoleum at Redwood Road put the Schoneys on 
notice that a later mausoleum at Mountain View would be of the 
same quality (June 21 Tr. at p. 18, Lines 6-10); whether a 
chapel has always been available at Mountain View (June 21 Tr. 
at p. 18, Line 22 - p. 19, Line 5); whether it was reasonable 
for Schoneys to purchase an alternate mausoleum space (at 
Sunset Lawn) (June 21 Tr. at p. 27); whether Memorial Estates 
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sold more crypts than had been constructed (June 21 Tr. at p. 
31, Lines 1-4); whether the Schoneys purchased a mausoleum at 
Redwood Road or Mountain View (June 21 Tr. at p. 36 and 37); 
whether Memorial Estates properly accounted for trust funds 
(June 21 Tr. at p. 43, Lines 8-22); whether Memorial Estates 
held a dead corpse as a hostage (June 21 Tr. at p. 4 6, Lines 
1-9); whether Memorial Estates told Schoneys that their money 
would be held in trust (June 21 Tr. at p. 46, Lines 10-19); 
whether Memorial Estates represented that a mausoleum would be 
built when there were no plans to do so (June 21 Tr. at p. 47, 
Lines 1-7); whether it was reasonable for Memorial Estates to 
substitute an LDS chapel for the Schoneys, who were a non-LDS 
family (June 21 Tr. at p. 48, Lines 12-22); whether a chapel 
was available at both Mountain View and Redwood Road (June 21 
Tr. at p. 51, Lines 1-3); whether Memorial Estates was 
prejudiced^ because Schoney answered interrogatories 
approximately 15 days late.^ (June 21 Tr. at p. 5, Lines 1-
15.) 
4 Memorial Estates was guilty of numerous discovery 
delays much more serious than 15 days. (See Brief of Appellant 
at p. 7.) 
5 Memorial Estates argued that the case of W. W. & W. B. 
Gardner v. Parkwest Valley, 568 P.2d 734 justified dismissal as 
a sanction. (June 21 Tr. at p. 4-5.) Without reading the 
case, Judge Moffat held that the Gardner case "requires" 
dismissal. (June 21 Tr. at 51.) 
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In summary, it was clear error for Judge Moffat to 
grant summary judgment in such a complicated case, and in face 
of numerous fact issues, without even reading the file. 
F. Refusal to Permit Schoneys to File a Complete Brief 
After losing in the trial court, Schoneys appealed. 
The legal theories were numerous and complex. At the 
conclusion of oral argument, Judge Moffat stated: 
I think Mr. Peck's motions are well taken 
in every instance. . . 
(June 21 Tr. at p. 51.) 
That simple statement covers a lot of territory. Such a 
shotgun ruling, ". . . made without a deliberate articulation 
of its rationale, including some appraisal of the factors 
underlying the court's decision [does not] allow for a 
disciplined and informed review of the Court's discretion." 
Sarqeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978). Compare 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.° In short, Schoney 
was left to brief all possible issues in a very complex case. 
b
 "The Court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules . . . 56. . . when the motion is based on more than 
one ground." 
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Schoney filed a 30 page preliminary draft brief, and 
moved for an additional five working days to file the final 
brief. The grounds for the motion were that the word 
processing equipment had broken down. (Motion and Order to 
File Brief with Leave to File Substitute Brief, dated February 
10, 1989.) That motion was denied. (Order, dated March 7, 
1989. ) See Exhibit A, 
With one exception, Schoney does not wish to reargue 
the substance of that order — nor would it be proper to do so. 
However, one aspect of that order raises due process concerns. 
Schoneys filed a 30 page preliminary draft brief. 
In connection with that filing, Schoney specifically noted 
that: 
Appellant's counsel has prepared a brief 
and motion to file with leave to substitute 
Exhibits A and B hereto are drafts of both. 
The draft of the brief is not the current 
one; the current one is in the word 
processor memory. At about 9:00 a.m. 
today, February 10, 1989, the office 
printer broke down. . .(Emphasis added.) 
(Motion to File Brief with Leave to File Substitute Brief, 
dated February 10, 1989.) The motion was attested by the 
manager of the word processing department. 
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This Court's order of March 7, 1989 did not permit 
Schoney to file the version of the brief that was finished— 
albeit locked in a broken down computer. Rather, this Court's 
order stated: 
It is further ORDERED that the draft brief 
filed on 10 February, 1989 shall comprise 
Appellant's Brief. Appellant shall have 
the draft bound and shall file the bound 
brief before 10 March, 1989. 
(Order, 7 March, 1989.) 
In summary, Schoney was faced with an awesome task to 
summarize six years of litigation in a final appellate brief. 
The task was especially difficult because of the superficial 
treatment of issues, and shotgun rulings below. (See Para. C, 
D, E, above.) Schoney had in fact written a complete brief. 
However, because of an equipment failure, Schoneys were not 
permitted to file that complete brief. 
G. Dissolution of Class 
The 30 page brief filed on February 10 did not 
include a treatment of class issues. The final 79 page brief, 
1
 Schoney believes that the Brief which was locked in 
the computer on February 10, 1989 was, in fact, the 79 page 
Brief dated 21 February, 1989 (which was rejected by this 
Court.) However, the attorney in charge of the file has been 
fired for his mishandling this appeal. Thus, it may not be 
possible to reconstruct exactly what was in the computer on 
February 10, 1989. 
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which was rejected by this Court, did include a treatment of 
the class issues. 
Without regard to fault or error,** the result is that 
the putative class has disappeared. However, that violates 
due process rights of the putative class members. 
An elementary and fundamental requirement 
of due process in any proceeding which is 
to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306; 70 
S.Ct. 652 (1950). 
Although Mullane was not a class action, it provides 
the due process touchstone for all class actions, see Phillips 
Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 012 (1985). In order to 
implement those due process considerations, Rule 23(e) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
8 This Court apparently views the issue as being 
Schoney's fault for trying to make substantive changes after a 
brief was filed pursuant to the Court's "Lodging Policy". See 
Order, 7 March, 1989. On the other hand, Schoney views the 
issue as clear error. Schoney contends that the February 10, 
1989 filing had nothing to do with the "Lodging Policy". (That 
policy has never been promulgated.) Rather, it was a garden 
variety showing of "good cause" for an enlargement of time 
pursuant to Rule 22(b), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
(See Schoneys' Motion for Review, dated 9 March, 1989.) 
13 
A class action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the 
Court, and notice of the dismissal or 
compromise shall be given to all members of 
the class in such manner as the court 
directs. (Emphasis added.) 
Due process considerations require that Rule 23(e) 
should apply even where the class has not been certified if 
there is any prejudice to absent class members. Simer v. Rios, 
661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981). 
In this case, absent class members are prejudiced 
because they might choose to file individual claims if they 
were aware that the class - was dissolved. Furthermore, this 
Court has failed to even consider Rule 23(e) in connection with 
the dismissal (or dissolution) of the class.^ 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
This case has been fraught with delay and superficial 
treatment by the trial court. The cumulative error required 
Schoney to write a far reaching brief on every possible aspect 
9 It is no solution for the Court to simply blame 
Schoney's counsel. Due process requires that the named 
plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of 
the class. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 
(1985). 
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of the case. Schoney accomplished that formidable task in a 
reasonable time. Because of equipment failure the final draft 
of the brief was delayed. This Court struck Schoney's final 
brief, and with that ruling the class also fell. 
The totality of these circumstances has deprived 
putative class members as well as Schoney of their due process 
rights. 
The only solution is to remand to the trial court for 
total reprocessing of the class issues and the summary judgment 
issues. 
this day of DATED o<C/  \JCC (//• , 1989 
ROBERT J. DEKRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
BY: 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
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EXHIBIT A 
Page 2 
The lodging policy in effect in February 1989, provided 
appellant five additional working days to correct technical 
defects and to file a substitute brief* Appellant failed to file 
a substitute brief within the five day period* By correspondence 
dated 16 February 1989, the Court notified appellant that the 
brief was in default and that the appeal could be dismissed 
unless a substitute brief was filed by 24 February 1989* 
Appellants substitute brief was filed on 21 February 
1989* The briof, exclusive of the table of contents, table of 
authorities and appendix, is 79 pages in length. Appellant's 
corrections go to the substance of the brief as well as to 
defects which may be addressed under the lodging policy. Thus, 
the substitute brief is improper* 
Now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that appellant's 
Motion To File Overlength Brief is denied. It is further ORDERED 
that the draft brief filed on 10 February 1989 shall comprise 
appellant's brief. Appellant shall have the draft bound and 
shall file the bound brief, together with seven copies, on or 
before 10 March 1983• Although th^ overlengfch brief is not 
accepted, the Appendix To Appellant's Brief, filed 21 February 
1989, is accepted. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL 
- OOOOO—— 
George K,. Schoney and 
Erma J. Schoney, et al./ 
Plaintiffs and Appellants/ 
Memorial Estates, Inc./ 
Defendants and Respondents• 
ORDER 
Case No* 880630-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon <a) appellant's 
several motions for extensions to file appellant's brief, (b) 
appellant's Motion To File Overlength Brief/ filed 21 February 
1989, (c) respondent's Motion To Dismiss/ filed 21 February 1989 
and (d) appellant's Motion To Refer Motion To Dismiss, filed 1 
March 1989. 
On 10 February 1989/ appellant filed a 30 page brief, in 
draft form, together with a Motion To File Brief With Leave To 
File Substitute Brief. Thereafter, on 21 February 1989, 
appellant filed a Motion To Extend Tine For Filing Substitute 
Brief and a Motion To File Overlength Brief. 
The substitute bri^f was filed pursuant to the Court's 
internal policy for lodging briefs* The purpose of the policy is 
to permit a party, who makes a good faith effort to timely file a 
brief, extra time to correct technical defects in the brief• 
Technical defects include improper covers, inadequate binding or 
lack of binding, incorrect pagination, and etc. The lodging 
policy does not provide an opportunity to amend the substance of 
the arguments contained in the brief. 
Page 3 
It is also ORDERED that respondent's Motion To Dismiss is 
denied• Respondent's brief shall be due thirty days from 10 
March 1989. That is, respondent shall file its brief on or before 
9 April 1989. Further/ it is ORDERED that appellant's Motion To 
Refer Motion To Dismiss is denied. 
Dated this ~7?£ day of March 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
4L& 
Judge Russell W. Bench 
1 I have the answer. I am looking for the Fifth Amended 
2 Complaint. I have got it. Thank you. 
3 You may proceed. It was out of order. 
4 I MR. HENRIOD: Thank you, your Honor. 
5 The first motion we would like to make is the 
6 motion to strike. A little background is helpful. The 
7 defendant made a motion for summary judgment on January 15th; 
8 and at that time, the plaintiffs1 response was to request 
9 the Court to allow them to address those issues with 
10 another amended complaint, the fifth one. 
11 On the part of the defendant, we reasonably 
12 anticipated they were going to cut down on the complaint, 
13 based on the argument that we made in our motion for 
14 summary judgment. As a matter of fact, they didn't. They 
15 left everything in, and included additional items to which 
16 we needed to do some discovery. 
17 The Court set a discovery schedule. The last 
18 date for responding to discovery was June 10th. On April 
19 2 9th, the defendant sent interrogatories to the plaintiff. 
20 There were no answers within 30 days. They were not 
21 answered by the 10th. There was communication with counsel. 
22 I don't know why they weren't answered on time. Some 
23 scheduling problems. 
24 We received a copy of the answer this morning as 
25 we came into the courtroom. It's the defendants' position 
1 that the complaint should be stricken and the default 
2 judgment should be entered against the plaintiff because of 
3 their failure to answer those interrogatories in a timely 
4 fashion. 
5 We would cite to the Court the case of W.W.&.W.B. 
6 Gardner, Inc. vs. Parkwest Valley, Inc., found at 568 P.2d, 
7 Page 734, a 1977 Utah case. The court in that case on the 
8 last page, Page 738, states halfway down the first column, 
9 "Under Rule 37(d), sanctions are justified without 
10 reference as to whether the inexcused failure to make 
11 discovery was willful. The sanction of default judgment is 
12 justified where there has been a frustration of the judicial 
13 process where the failure to respond to discovery in each 
14 trial on the merits make it impossible to ascertain whether 
15 the allegations of the answer have any factual merit." 
16 It's important to note that the original complaint 
17 was filed back in 1982; and our summary judgment motion went 
18 to issues that the plaintiff readily responded to as being 
19 out of date; namely, whether the mausoleum was built or not. 
20 These interrogatories that were sent and received the 15th, 
21 the amended complaint went right to the heart of this case. 
22 The contentions in the interrogatories, is whether they 
23 still claim a certain cause of action exists and what the 
24 factual basis for that is, we do not have in time to prepare 
25 this motion today. We only have just seen them. 
1 Now, this same case, the Gardner case, on Page 737 
2 in that case, the party that had answered late had received 
3 answers to interrogatories between the time they were due; 
4 between the motion for sanctions and the time for hearing. 
5 And the Court said that is not good enough. That is a 
6 failure to answer, and failure all by itself, provides the 
7 impetus for the invoking of sanctions. Once the motion has 
8 been filed, you can't put a last-minute answer in and 
9 remedy your problem. 
10 We've got a trial date set in this case for 
H July 6th. If the Court were to combine these motions with 
12 the motion for summary judgment that Mr. Peck is going to 
13 argue the merits in this case is so negligible, combined 
14 with this failure to answer on time that we think the 
15 appropriate entry be a default judgment. 
16 Thank you, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. 
18 MR. BERTCH: The mailing certificate on the 
19 interrogatories does reveal it was mailed allegedly April 
20 2 9th, 1988. Now, my secretary tells me that we didn't 
21 receive it. And I have no reason to doubt her word. I was 
22 on vacation from June the 3rd to June 12th. While I was 
23 gone, Mr. Henriod gave my office the courtesy of a phone 
24 call to see if there was a mix-up or a problem. And in 
25 fact, my secretary indicated that she hadn't got the 
1 interrogatories. And so he sent over another copy. 
2 When I got back from vacation, I prepared the 
3 answer. The only living plaintiff left was on vacation the 
4 last part of last week, and was unable to sign them until 
5 last night. So, I did exercise as much diligence as I could 
6 once we actually got the discovery in our office. 
7 If I could just step back and put this in the big 
8 picture. The real problem is, they waited until the last 
9 minute to send the interrogatories. And then, when we were 
10 possibly a few days late on it, there was no extra time left, 
11 And in the context of a seven-year-old case, it doesn't seem 
12 fair to me to do that. To send interrogatories and require 
13 answers eight days before the discovery deadline and then 
14 complain if they're not answered strictly within 30 days. 
15 I would suggest to the Court, that we not delay 
16 the trial date. That's assuming that the Court does not 
17 grant their motions for summary judgment. The matter in 
18 the interrogatories is, for the most part, cumulative of 
19 things that we have already discovered. The defendant has 
20 had an opportunity to take depositions of both plaintiffs 
21 while they were still living, then Erma is still with us. 
22 Did not inquire into these matters at that time. 
23 The only new matter in the fifth amended complaint 
24 has to do with the allegations that the mausoleum as built 
25 didn't look like the ones that were shown to the plaintiffs. 
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